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Section 1: Introduction1 
 
One grave consequence of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America (USA) was the 
rise in the negative stereotyping of Muslims throughout much of the west, with anti-Muslim sentiment 
increasingly identifiable on various levels of social, civil and political expression. Islamic states have 
registered their concerns through international mechanisms, most prominently on the United Nations 
(UN) platform. The main recourse of Islamic states during the past decade has been via the concept of 
‘defamation of religion’ – a claim of damage and disrepute being done to Islam – which was formally 
introduced in the UN as a draft resolution by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1999. A 
resolution was passed, setting the concept on a course towards international customary law. It has 
been regularly discussed, debated and amended since.  
 
Sectors of civil society, along with various states, have expressed alarm at the formalisation of the 
concept of defamation of religion, which they have condemned as being unclear, prohibitively 
restrictive and liable to impinge on other formally recognised rights and freedoms. These dissenting 
voices have argued that provisions to protect individuals from religious discrimination already exist in 
UN treaties, and that the solution to the problem is in their implementation, not in the creation of new 
laws. This debate has led to the examination of the defamation and blasphemy laws already in use in 
various Islamic states, both the manner of their use and misuse.  
 
This paper aims to provide a general overview of the current debate on religious defamation laws 
internationally, and to research and analyse the use and impact of the ‘defamation of religion’ concept 
and blasphemy laws on freedom of expression in three OIC member states. Part I of the paper will 
explore the evolution of the concept within the UN in three sections: Section One looks at the 
positions held by the OIC since the introduction of the initial resolution on defamation of religion at 
the UN; Section Two explores the counter positions held by NGOs and states in disagreement; and 
Section Three examines the treatment of this concept in other UN reports, namely from its 
committees and independent experts, as a measure of the current international consensus. Part II of 
this project is a study of three selected OIC member states: Algeria, Syria and Pakistan. In this section 
we present the national laws on religious defamation and blasphemy in each country, including 
amendments and contemporary moves towards reform. We then follow with a series of recent cases 
that have employed these laws in each of the three countries, and analyse the use of each in relation 
to the impact it had on freedom of expression, and other rights and freedoms enshrined in human 
rights law. By doing so we aim to identify whether the de facto prohibition of defamation relating to 
religion falls within the spirit of, or conversely is repugnant to each state’s obligations under 
international human rights law.  
                                                 
1
    This report was researched and drafted by Julia Alfandari, Jo Baker and Regula Atteya, members of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 2010/2011 Human Rights Clinic in London (Lynn Welchman, Director), 
under the supervision of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS). Julia Alfandari 
(julia.alfandari@gmail.com) is a post graduate student of International Law and has previously worked as a project 
manager for the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) in Jerusalem; Jo Baker 
(jobaker2000@hotmail.com) is a post graduate student of International Human Rights Law and formerly ran the 
Urgent Appeals Programme at the Asian Human Rights Commission/Asian Legal Resource Centre in Hong Kong; 
Regula Atteya is a post graduate student of International Human Rights Law and an LLB 
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Section 2: Defamation of religions at the UN 
 
2.1 The OIC on defamation of religions        
The OIC is the leading actor in the international discourse around the concept of defamation of 
religions, insisting that defamation of religions must be actively combated by the international 
community. The OIC’s activism stems from its concerns about the rise of Islamophobia in western 
countries,2 and it consequently aims to protect Muslim communities outside Muslim states. The OIC 
uses several fora to actively promote the debate around the concept of defamation of religions at the 
UN, including submissions of draft resolutions at the Human Rights Council (HRC) and General 
Assembly (GA), and within the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards 
(the Ad Hoc Committee). The OIC ultimately aims for the establishment of an international legally 
binding instrument to combat what it considers to be the defamation of religions, as will be elaborated 
in the paragraphs below.  
 
2.1.1 The OIC’s position, goals and proposals in relation to the defamation of religions 
Islamophobia is of great concern to the OIC and holds a prominent place within the 
organisation. According to the OIC, Islamophobia ‘signifies the contemporary proliferation of 
discrimination against Muslims and distortion of Islam’.3 The organisation has argued that 
Islamophobia is a ‘manifestation of racial discrimination that runs contrary to the fundamental values 
of mankind and principles of human rights, which provide safeguards against discrimination and 
intolerance’.4 This racism manifests itself against the external, physical signifiers of Muslim persons 
and their religion and cultural beliefs. According to the OIC, Islamophobia is prevalent in many western 
societies in areas such as mainstream politics, the media, the educational system, research reports, 
articles and publications of reputed institutions and academics and in legislation. Hence the formation 
of a collective misrepresentation about Islam and Muslims has resulted, along with the dissemination 
of an open hostility and entrenchment of hatred against them, which targets Muslims’ identity, 
honour, self-worth, and self-confidence. Therefore, according to the OIC and its supporters, the 
defamation of Islam profoundly jeopardises every Muslim’s essential human rights. According to this 
understanding, the OIC concludes that Muslims are in need of special protection and that 
Islamophobia has the potential to endanger global peace and security, and therefore requires the 
intervention of the international community.  
 
The importance that the OIC attaches to Islamophobia is demonstrated in its political agenda.  
Combating Islamophobia is part of the OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges 
Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century (the Ten-Year Plan) that was put together at the Third 
Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (held on 7 and 8 December 2005 in Makah, 
                                                 
2 The OIC is not consistent with the terminology, refeering to both ‘non-Islamic countries’ and ‘Western countries’,see for 
example A/61/981 S/2007/ 656 Annex III to letter dated 30.5.2007 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; GA Draft Res. 31 October 2005, A/C.3/60/L.29. 
3 Second Observatory Report on Islamophobia, p. 5 ff., http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=182. See also definition of 
Islamophobia by HRC 2 September 2008 A/HRC/9/12, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerances, Doudou Diene, on the manifestations of defamations of religions and in 
particular on the serious implications of Islamophobia on the enjoyment of all rights, page 8 paragraph 19: ‘This term refers to a 
baseless hostility and fear vis-à-vis Islam, and as a result a fear of and aversion towards all Muslims or the majority of them. It 
also refers to the practical consequences of this hostility in terms of discrimination, prejudices and unequal treatment of which 
Muslims (individuals and communities) are victims and their exclusion from major political and social spheres. The term was 
invented in response to a new reality: the increasing discrimination against Muslims which has manifested itself in recent 
years.’  
4 First OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia, http://www.scribd.com/doc/4994369/First-OIC-Islamophobia-Report; Second 
Observatory Report on Islamophobia, http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=182.  
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Saudi Arabia).5 The extraordinary session was organised in response to the Mohammed Cartoon 
controversy.6 The Ten-Year Plan tasked the OIC to establish the Observatory on Islamophobia (the 
Observatory) to counter Islamophobia by monitoring all its forms, and to initiate a structured dialogue 
in order to project the true values of Islam as a religion of moderation, peace and tolerance.7 To 
achieve this, the Observatory produces a monthly bulletin that reports incidences of Islamophobia in 
the west, as well as an annual report that covers all the relevant developments, the efforts and 
achievements of the OIC during the period under review. With these means, the Observatory aims to 
raise awareness of the threat posed by Islamophobia to peace, security and peaceful coexistence 
amongst individuals and nations. To date, the Observatory has published three reports.8 
 
Consequential to the OIC’s understanding of Islamophobia, and more generally of defamation of 
religions, the OIC’s goal is the establishment of a legally binding institutional instrument to combat 
defamation of religions. Faced with the criticism that the criminalisation of this concept could lead to 
an undue restriction of the freedom of expression, the OIC argues that it is neither against the criticism 
of religion nor is it calling for a banning of criticism of religions.9 While on the one hand the OIC argues 
that the normative framework to combat defamation of religions, both in the international contexts, 
does exist, it holds  however that full use and implementation are needed.10 On the other hand, within 
its own publication and public statements the OIC has repeatedly called for a legally binding 
instrument, particularly in its first observatory report and more recently at the Conference of the 
Foreign Affairs Ministers in September 2010.11 On such occasions it has given minimal elaboration on 
the modalities of such an instrument and its implementation.12 However its proposals for a legally 
binding instrument at the Ad Hoc Committee on the elaboration of complementary standards are 
more concrete and is discussed in more detail in section 2.1.3.  
 
2.1.2 Draft resolutions by the OIC at the UN on the defamation of religions 
The issue of ‘defamation of religions’ was first brought to the attention of UN member states 
when the OIC submitted its first draft resolution in 1999 to the UN Commission of Human Rights 
(UNCHR). It then submitted draft resolutions every year to the UNCHR (from 2006), and to its 
                                                 
5 OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century, paragraph VII 
Combating Islamophobia, http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/10-years-plan.htm. 
6 The Danish newspaper Jyllands-Post published on 30 September 2005 12 cartoons most of  which depicted the Prophet 
Mohammed. The most infamous cartoon depicted the Prophet with a bomb on his head. The publication led to great 
international controversy and massive demonstrations across the Muslim world, which also resulted in violence. See also 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Questions and Answers on the Danish Cartoons, when speech offends’, 24 February 2006, 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2006/02/15/denmar12676_txt.htm. 
7 OIC Ten-Year Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century, paragraph VII (2) 
Combating Islamophobia, http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/10-years-plan.htm. 
8 First OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia http://www.scribd.com/doc/4994369/First-OIC-Islamophobia-Report; Second 
and Third Observatory Report on Islamophobia, http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=182.  
9 Danish Daily Jyllands Posten, 28.10.2008. Interview with the Secretary General of the OIC, http://www.oic-
oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=168. 
10 This is the position that the OIC holds with his submissions of draft resolutions as will be further elaborated below in section 
2.1.2. 
11  Declaration by the Annual Coordination Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of OIC member states on Countering 
Islamophobia, 24 September 2010, http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=182.  
12  First Observatory Report, http://www.scribd.com/doc/4994369/First-OIC-Islamophobia-Report, p. 31,’a) There is a need for a 
legal instrument on the "Elimination of Religious Discrimination and Intolerance” with a Committee to implement it and 
monitor it. This should take into consideration the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief Proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981 and UN 
General Assembly and Human Rights Council resolutions on defamation of religions. b) Victims of Islamophobia must be 
encouraged and given necessary help to file complaints under the 1503 Human Rights Council Complaint Procedure.’ The call 
for a legally binding instrument at the Foreign Affairs Conference was not further elaborated. At the same conference the OIC 
also called upon the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to set up an observatory at her office aimed at monitoring and 
documenting acts that lead to incitement to religious hatred, hostility and violence. 
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predecessor, the Human Rights Council (HRC), and since 2005 every year to the GA.13 The resolutions 
have been consistently adopted. 14  
 
The first draft resolution was submitted in 1999 under the title of ‘defamation of Islam’.15 With the 
second draft resolution in 2000, the OIC changed the title to ‘defamation of religions’.16 Since 2002, 
draft resolutions have been entitled ‘combating defamation of religions’. While the most recent draft 
resolution is still entitled ‘combating defamation of religions’, in the text of the resolution the term 
defamation of religions has been substituted with vilification of religions.17 Despite the change in the 
terminology used in the draft resolutions, the content has changed little. While the OIC has adapted 
the title to more general terms since the first submission, the content has stayed focused on the 
defamation of Islam. Islam and Muslims were the only religion and religious group specifically 
mentioned in the submissions until the most recent draft resolution which incorporated 
Christianophobia and Judophobia as well.18 The change from defamation of religions to vilification of 
religions is understood to be an attempt by the OIC to gain more positive votes for its draft resolution. 
However the efforts have yielded few results; support for the resolutions has continued to decrease, 
as we report in detail later in this report. 
 
While the first draft resolutions from the OIC to the UN stated that defamation of religions leads to 
human rights violations, the drafts initially did not refer to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).19 In the draft resolution to the GA in 2006 the OIC first began to argue that 
defamation of religions is in violation of the right enshrined in Article 19 of the ICCPR, but did not  
directly refer to its concept. Article 19 of the ICCPR protects the freedom to hold opinions and the right 
to freedom of expression. Paragraph 3 of the Article restricts the scope of protection as follows:  
The exercise of the rights provided in paragraph 2 of this article freedom of expression 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:  
a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; b) For the protection of national 
                                                 
13  CHR Draft Res. 20 April 1999, E/CN.4/1999/L.40; CHR Rev. Draft Res. 5 April 2000, E/CN.4/2000/L.65; CHR Draft 11 April 2001, 
E/CN.4/2001/L.7/; CHR Draft Res. 12 April 2001, E/CN.4/2001/L.7/Rev. 1; CHR Draft Res. 3 April 2002, E/CN.4/2002/L.9; CHR 
Draft Res. 8 April 2003, E/CN.4/2003/L.16; CHR Draft Res. 24 March 2004, E/CN.4/2004/L.5; CHR Draft Res. 7 April 2005, 
E/CN.4/2005/L.12; GA Draft Res.  31 October 2005, A/C.3/60/L.29; GA Draft Res. 2 November 2006, A/C.3/61/L.28; GA Draft 
Res. 2 November 2007, A/C.3/62/L.35; GA Draft Res. 30 October 2008, A/C.3/63/L.22; GA Rev. Draft Res. 12 November 2008, 
A/C.3/63/L.22/ Rev. 1; HRC Draft. Res. 20 March 2008, A/HRC/7/L.15; HRC Draft. Res. 11 March 2009, A/HRC/10/L.2; HRC Rev. 
Draft. Res. 26 March 2009, A/HRC/10/L.2/ Rev.1; GA Draft Res. 29 October 2009, A/C.3/L.27; HRC Draft Res. 11 March 2010, 
A/HRC/13/L.1; GA Draft Res. 28 October 2010, A/C.3/65/L.46; GA Draft Res. 19 November 2010, A/C.3/65/L.46. Rev.1. 
14 CHR Res. 1999/82, 22 March – 30 April 1999, E/CN.4/1999/167; CHR Res. 200/84, 26 April 2000, E/CN.4/RES/2000/84; CHR Res. 
2001/4, 18 April 2001, E/CN.4/RES/2001/4; CHR Res. 2002/9, 15 April 2002, E/CN.4/RES/2002/9; CHR Res. 2003/4, 14 April 
2003, E/CN.4/RES/2003/4; CHR Res. 2004/6, 13 April 2004, E/CN.4/RES/2004/6; CHR Res. 2005/3, 12 April 2005, 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/3; GA Res. 60/150, 20 January 2006, A/RES/60/150; HRC Dec. 1/107, 30 June 2006, A/HRC/DEC/1/107; GA 
Res. 61/164, 21 February 2007, A/RES/61/164; HRC Res. 4/9, 30 March 2007, A/HRC/RES/4/9; GA Res. 62/154, 6 March 2008, 
A/RES/62/154; HRC Res. 7/9, 27 March 2008, A/HRC/RES/7/19; GA Res. 63/ 171, 24 March 2009, A/RES/63/171; HRC Res. 
10/22, 26 March 2009, A/HRC/RES/10/22; GA Res. 64/156, 8 March 2010, A/RES/64/156. 
15  CHR Draft Res. 20 April 1999, E/CN.4/1999/L.40. 
16  CHR Rev. Draft Res. 5 April 2000, E/CN.4/2000/L.65. 
17  GA Draft Res. 19 November 2010, A/C.3/65/L.46. Rev.1. The OIC has used the term ‘vilification of Islam’ before, in its First 
Observatory Report on Islamophobia. 
18  International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), 25 November 2010,‘Support for ‘defamation of religions’ continues to decline; 
draft resolution passes by only 12 votes’, http://www.ishr.ch/general-assembly/964-support-for-defamation-of-religion-
continues-to-decline-draft-resolution-passes-by-only-12-
votes?utm_source=ISHR+Publications+and+News&utm_campaign=5bea21d79e-
NEWYORK_RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medium=email. The usage of the term ‘Judophobia’ by the OIC has led to some 
controversy, since it differs from the usual terminology of the UN that uses anti-Semitism. 
19  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
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security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.  
 
Since 2006 the draft resolutions have emphasised that the right to freedom of expression carries with 
it such special duties and responsibilities and may therefore be subject to such limitations as are 
provided for by law and are necessary for the respect of the rights or reputations of others, the 
protection of national security or of public, health or morals. According to the OIC, it must be 
understood that defamation of religions constitutes a limitation as provided by the law according to 
Article 19 (3) (a) and (b) of the ICCPR, based on two perceptions. Firstly to the OIC’s understanding, as 
elaborated above, defamation of religions violates the human rights of the individual and therefore 
constitutes a restriction under Article 19 paragraph 3 (a). Secondly, defamation of religion endangers 
global peace and security, which therefore also constitutes a restriction under Article 19 paragraph 3 
(b). 
 
The OIC has also utilised Article 20 of the ICCPR to support the recognition of defamation of religions. 
With its draft resolution to the HRC in 2008 the OIC connected defamation of religions to ‘incitement 
to racial and religious hatred, hostility or violence’, referring to the prohibitions of Article 20 of the 
ICCPR without directly naming it.20  
 
The draft resolution to the GA in 2009 refers directly to Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR for the first 
time, as well as to 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).21 The change in the 
terminology used by the OIC in the latest draft resolution to ‘vilification of religions’ did not alter the 
OIC’s argument in relation to these Articles, but simply conferred the same arguments to the new 
language.  
 
It is important to note that the OIC’s draft resolutions do not call for a legally binding international 
instrument to prohibit the defamation or the vilification of religions, but argues that the concept is 
already prohibited within the existing international human rights framework, in the Articles mentioned 
above. Nevertheless the OIC ultimately aims for such an instrument to combat defamation of religions. 
The reason for the absence for such a strong demand in the draft resolution may lie in the continuing 
decrease of favourable votes for the resolutions during recent years. Such a strong demand could risk 
the continuous adoption of the ‘combating defamation of religions’ resolutions, which the OIC is 
unlikely to want to jeopardise. Resolutions, even without the content that demands the establishment 
of a new legal instrument, are in the interest of the OIC. While resolutions are not legally binding, over 
time and as a result of states’ practice upholding the concepts of resolutions, such concepts may 
develop and formalise into customary international law.  Therefore this could lead to the formation of 
the concept of defamation of religions into customary international law.22  
Meanwhile the OIC has transferred its battle for a new legal instrument to combat defamation of 
religions to the Ad Hoc Committee.  
 
2.1.3 The OIC’s contribution to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary 
Standards  
The Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards (Ad Hoc Committee) 
was founded by HRC decision 3/103 and was tasked with the elaboration of complementary standards 
in accordance with paragraph 199 of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action which 
‘recommends that the Commission on Human Rights prepare complementary international standards 
to strengthen and update international instruments against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia 
                                                 
20  HRC Draft. Res. 20 March 2008, A/HRC/7/L.15. 
21  HRC Draft. Res. 11 March 2009, A/HRC/10/L.2. 
22  Steiner, Alston, Goodman, International Human Rights in Context,3
rd 
edn, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) p. 75ff.  
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and related intolerance in all their aspects’.23 The complementary standards can be in the form of a 
convention, or additional protocol(s) to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD).  
 
In the first Ad Hoc Committee session, held in 2008 from 11 to 21 February and from 15 to 19 
December, the delegate of Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, argued that the Ad Hoc Committee must 
elaborate on specific proposals for complementary standards in the form of a binding legal instrument. 
Despite objections from several western countries such as Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Austria to the 
need for a new legal instrument or such discussions,24 Pakistan responded by arguing that the need for 
the elaboration was not to be questioned, as this had been clearly stipulated in paragraph 199 of the 
Durban Programme of Action.25 It was supported by comments from other OIC countries such as Egypt 
and Syria. The first session ended with no agreement on new complementary standards.  
 
The second session of the Ad Hoc Committee was held from 19 to 30 October 2009. The session was 
marked by the extremely divergent views of states on the necessity, content and format of future 
international standards.26 Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, together with Nigeria on behalf of the African 
Group, argued that it was time to move away from expert consultations and general comments to the 
designing of specific proposals for complementary standards. Western states such as the USA, Norway 
and Sweden (the latter on behalf of the EU) rejected the elaboration of an optional protocol, arguing 
that the existing legal framework provided sufficient protection against discrimination. Pakistan, 
together with Nigeria, proposed specific provisions for an optional protocol to the ICERD in relation to 
the defamation of religions, including a proposal for a provision governing incitement to racial, ethnic 
or religious hatred.27 This attempt to include the concept of defamation of religions largely failed since 
non-Islamic, mainly western and several Latin American states, rejected this concept altogether. The 
second session ended with no agreement on new complementary standards.  
The third session was initially planned for November 2010 but was then postponed to 2011. No 
date has yet been set.28  
 
2.2 Counter positions of human rights organisations and UN member states   
As described in the earlier section, the issue of defamation of religions has tended to split the 
international community between predominantly Western European and North American states, 
which oppose the concept, and a large proportion of the developing world, which has supported 
resolutions on the issue.29 However since 2008, and especially since the Durban Review Conference in 
April 2009, a clear change of discourse has become apparent among UN member states from Latin 
                                                 
23 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, www.un.org/durbanreview2009/pdf/DDPA_full_text.pdf.  
24  HRC, 24 February 2009 A/HRC/10/88, p.17. 
25  Ibid. p. 47. 
26  HRC, 17 February 2009 A/HRC/13/CRP.1. 
27  HRC, 21 January 2010 A/HRC/13/58 ,’States parties shall immediately undertake to adopt positive measures designed to 
eliminate all incitement to racial, ethnic or religious hatred or discrimination and, to this end, shall commit themselves, inter 
alia: To strengthen their legislation or adopt necessary legal provisions to prohibit and suppress racist and xenophobic 
platforms and to discourage the integration of political parties who promote such platforms in government alliances in order to 
legitimize the implementation of these platforms.’ In addition, Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, added the following two 
proposals: ‘(a)To declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas aimed at discrimination or hatred, as well as all 
acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any particular group of persons; (b)To declare illegal and prohibit 
organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which encourage and incite racial, ethnic or religious 
hatred or discrimination, and shall declare participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; (c) 
Not to permit national or local public authorities to incite racial hatred or discrimination; (d) Not to permit political parties to 
incite racial hatred or discrimination.’ 
28 Welcome Desk, Latest Human Rights Council news, http://www.welcomedesk.org/index.php?lang=en. 
29 International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU), Speaking Freely about Religion: Religious Freedom, Defamation and 
Blasphemy, 2 November 2009, http://www.iheu.org/UN-blasphemy-report. 
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America or Africa, which have begun to slowly distance themselves from the OIC agenda. Those 
changes have resulted partially from pressure exerted by a number of western states, such as the USA, 
Canada, Australia and all members of the European Union.30 A further force engaged in lobbying work 
against the resolutions is composed of international and local NGOs. The Cairo Institute for Human 
Rights Studies (CIHRS), the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, ARTICLE 19 and the International 
Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) are just some of the NGOs that have been actively engaged in the 
debate.  
 
2.2.1 The failings of resolutions on defamation of religions in light of international human rights law 
The main concern expressed by dissenting actors has been that the resolutions presented by 
OIC member states to UN bodies do not adequately deal with the core problem: the rise in incidents of 
physical as well as socio-economic discrimination against individuals and groups based on their 
religion, specifically against those of Muslim background.31 There is a general consensus among actors 
of the international community that the rise of Islamophobia is threatening, and needs to be 
addressed. However human rights advocates and several western states argue that the approach 
pursued by OIC member states does not counter the alarming problem adequately but rather crucially 
undermines the fundamental principles of human rights law. The call by human rights organisations 
and states, such as Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic and the USA32 has also been joined by some 
UN Special Rapporteurs33 emphasising that the right to freedom of religion or belief as protected 
under international human rights law is primarily concerned with ‘the individual and, to some extent, 
the collective rights of the community concerned but it does not protect religions and belief per se’.34 
However, as discussed below in greater depth, previous resolutions on defamation of religions have 
called on the need to protect and respect systems of beliefs and religious institutions, while placing a 
particular emphasis on the protection of Islam. 
 
i. Defining the concept of defamation of religion in international law 
Opposing voices have highlighted the ambiguous nature of the concept defamation of 
religions, and the lack of a clear definition in any of the OIC submitted resolutions. The discussed 
concept was scrutinised in a joint declaration in 2008 by Frank La Rue (UN Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of opinion and expression), Miklos Haraszti (OSCE Representative on freedom of the media), 
Catalina Botero (OAS Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression), and Faith Pansy Tlakula (ACHPR 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression) entitled ‘Defamation of Religions and Anti-Terrorism 
and Anti-Extremism Legislation’. This declaration concluded that ‘defamation’ referred to the 
reputation of individuals, but when applied to a collective it may easily become subject to abuse in 
favour of a certain interest or idea, thereby suppressing the right to freedom of expression. ‘Religion’ 
on the other hand does not have a reputation on its own (like any other ideology or opinion) and 
therefore the ‘defamation’ of it severely contradicts international standards.35 The concept of 
                                                 
30 PANGEA – Model UN Conference, Combating Defamation of Religion, http://hickoryinternationalcouncil.com/modelun/human-
rights-commission/#religion. 
31 GA, 20-24 April 2009, A/CONF.211/L.1. 
32 ISHL, ‘Human Rights Council continues to be divided over 'defamation of religions'’, 4 October 2010, 
http://www.ishr.ch/council/921-human-rights-council-continues-to-be-divided-over-defamation-of-religions; and ISHL, ‘Human 
Rights Council: heavy criticism against Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression’, 3 September 2009, 
http://www.ishr.ch/archive-council/523-human-rights-council-heavy-criticism-against-special-rapporteur-on-freedom-of-
expression. 
33 See subsequent section 2.3.1. 
34 HRC, 29 August 2008, A/HRC/9/NGO/15. and HRC, 20 September 2006, A/HRC/2/3, para 38. 
35 International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expressions, Joint Declaration on Defamation of Religions and Anti-
Terrorism and Anti-Extremism Legislation,  15 December 2008, http://www.osce.org/node/35639. IHEU, Speaking Freely About 
Religion: Religious Freedom, Defamation and Blasphemy, 2 November 2009, p.10, http://www.iheu.org/UN-blasphemy-report: 
regarding the difficulties attached to combined concept, ‘*j+udicial standards of truth are notoriously difficult to apply to 
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defamation of religions is subsequently not only shifting the focus of the individual towards a system 
of belief, but NGOs such as ARTICLE 19 and CIHRS have stressed that the concept's vague nature could 
allow the ruling body to implement policies that conflict with international standards. Particular 
attention is drawn to blasphemy laws in many OIC member states, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.36 
In a policy paper produced by IHEU in 2009, the NGO explicitly warns that ‘blasphemy laws continue to 
be used to protect politically dominant religions from dissent, to prosecute objections to human rights 
abuses in the name of religion, and to exempt powerful religious institutions from scrutiny and 
criticism’.37 
 
Apart from UN member states in the west that have persistently rejected past resolutions, some 
abstaining states such as India or Colombia have also expressed their concern at the ambiguous nature 
of the resolution. In a vote by the Social, Humanitarian Cultural Affairs Committee (Third Committee) 
in November 2009, Colombia for instance justified its decision to abstain by arguing that the failure to 
clearly define the concept defamation of religions in resolutions ‘could give rise to diverse 
interpretations and might limit freedom of expression’.38 India on the other hand, which contains the 
second largest Muslim population after Indonesia, has also maintained its right to abstain. In the 
November 2009 vote India abstained due to the narrow focus advocated in resolutions on one religion 
– Islam. India also complained that the resolution appeared to conflate race and religion:  
‘*O+ur concerns remain on this resolution as it continues to focus on a single religion. We believe that 
all religions face negative stereotyping in one situation or another in varying degree. We feel that this 
issue is best addressed under the rubric of either religious intolerance or the abuse of the freedom 
expression. We also have reservations at attempts to link this issue with racism.’39 
 
ii. International legal frameworks and defamation of religions  
The resolutions adopted by the GA, the UN Commission on Human Rights (until 2006) or the 
UNHRC (since 2006) are not binding; however as previously mentioned in this paper, over the course 
of time and as a result of states’ practice upholding concepts encapsulated in OIC resolutions, the 
resolutions may pave the way for the formation of customary international law.40  In an attempt to 
reduce the likelihood of establishing defamation of religions as a norm in customary international law, 
NGOs and Special Rapporteurs have repeatedly emphasised the need for states to properly implement 
and further strengthen existing international standards in order to effectively counter the rising trend 
of discrimination based on religion or incitement to religious hatred. 
 
Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR compose the core elements of the legal framework in the debate. 
Special Rapporteurs (see subsequent section) and NGOs have assumed a decisive role in articulating 
the importance and sufficiency of the ICCPR. In coalitions as well as individually, NGOs have frequently 
criticised OIC resolutions as well as the national legislation of OIC member states for not adequately 
complying with international standards on freedom of expression. In a recent letter signed by a 
coalition of 47 human rights organisations, UNHRC member states were urged not to adopt any 
resolution on ‘combating defamation of religions’ that were contrary to Article 19 and 20 of the ICCPR, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
questions of faith. Opinions on religion, or artistic interpretations, or even satire of religion, are often susceptible to being 
proven true or false. Thus, the so called ‘truth defence’ would not be readily available to anyone accused of defamation of 
religion’. 
36 HRC, 29 August 2008, A/HRC/9/NGO/15. The statement draws attention to the application of blasphemy laws justified through 
laws criminalizing defamation of religions. It warns that ‘blasphemy laws in many countries are used to prevent any criticism of 
religions, religious leaders and religious institutions, in clear breach of international guarantees of freedom of expression.’ 
37 IHEU, ‘Speaking Freely About Religion: Religious Freedom, Defamation and Blasphemy’, 2 November 2009, 
http://www.iheu.org/UN-blasphemy-report. 
38  GA, 12 November 2009, GA/SHC/3966, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gashc3966.doc.htm. 
39 Third Committee, 12  November 2009, A/C.3/64/L.27, http://www.eyeontheun.org/documents-item.asp?d=8151&id=11240. 
40 Thirlway, H. ‘The Sources of International Law’, Evans, M.D. (3
rd
 ed.), 2010, Oxford University Press: New York.  
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and to vote against complementary standards to the ICERD. One of the main issues debated in 
statements as well as written and oral interventions to the UN relates to the question of ‘hate speech’. 
Terminology applied in OIC draft resolutions is argued to re-define the limits to hate speech aimed at 
safeguarding religions. Those terms include ‘negative’ or ‘deliberate stereotyping’, ‘intolerance’, or 
‘identifying Islam with terrorism’.41 By conflating the concept of defamation of religions with Article 
20(2) of the ICCPR, which defines the limits between freedom of expression and protection of equality, 
dissenting voices fear that defamation of religions may fall into the category of incitement to hatred 
and can therefore no longer be protected by provisions set out in Article 19 on freedom of 
expression.42  
 
The CIHRS has rejected such reasoning by claiming that none of the proposed conditions that are 
encapsulated in the OIC drafts and resolutions adopted by the UNGA are compatible with the criteria 
that constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence as laid out in Article 20(2) of the 
ICCPR. Moreover, given that the OIC resolutions particularly aim towards the protection of a belief 
system and not the individual believers, the provisions contained in international human rights 
frameworks may not actually apply. Paragraph 2 of a recent resolution on ‘combating defamation of 
religions’ adopted by the HRC in March 2010 illustrates one of many examples describing the 
resolutions' focus: ‘*The OIC+ expresses deep concern at the negative stereotyping and defamation of 
religions and manifestations of intolerance and discrimination in matters of religion or belief still 
evident in the world, which have led to intolerance against the followers of these religions.’43 
 
In the above mentioned letter addressed to UNHRC member states, organisations warned that ‘laws 
prohibiting defamation of religions are often counterproductive and prone to being abused against 
religious minorities that they purport to protect’. NGOs therefore advised the UNHRC that inter-
cultural and inter-religious understanding can only be fostered through open debate and dialogue in a 
pluralist setting.44 Also, states such as Sweden (on behalf of the European Union) have expressed grave 
concern at the suggested resolutions on ‘combating defamation of religions’ as a response to 
discrimination, and have warned that ‘it would limit freedom of expression and might endanger the 
atmosphere of tolerance that would enable people of different religions or beliefs to coexist without 
fear’.45 Together with the USA, Sweden has reiterated the need to apply existing legal frameworks in 
order to remain consistent with international human rights law. In concurrence with this view is Brazil, 
which has so far abstained from its vote due to its concern that ‘the challenges for human rights 
identified in the resolution need to be addressed in a context that is not detrimental to the protection 
of other fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the freedom of expression.’46 
 
Brazil argued that the concept of defamation of religions was not in line with international human 
rights standards and that Articles 19(3) and 20(2) of the ICCPR and existing frameworks were more 
                                                 
41 HRC, Res. 13/16, 25 March 2010, A/HRC/RES/13/16. 
42 Article 20 ICCPR, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art20. 
 Conflation between defamation of religions and incitement to religious hatred and violence first appeared in a draft resolution 
of March 2008  (HRC Draft. Res., A/HRC/7/L.15) and since 2009 direct reference to Article 19 and 20 of the ICCPR had been 
incorporated in OIC resolutions. HRC Resolution of March 2010 (A/HRC/RES/13/16) illustrates a recent example of the 
conflation between the two terms ‘Stressing that defamation of religions is a serious affront to human dignity leading to a 
restriction on the freedom of religion of their adherents and incitement to religious hatred and violence.’ 
43 HRC, Res. 13/ 16, 25 March 2010, A/HRC/RES/13/16, para 2. 
44  UNHRC, Civil Society Organisations to State Representatives on ‘Defamation of Religions’, 11 March 2010, 
www.article19.org/.../letters/letter-from-civil-society-organizations-to-state-representatives-defamation-.pdf ; GA, Adaptation 
of the Final Documents and the Report of the Durban Review Conference, 20-24 April 2009, A/CONF.211/L.1 
45 Third Committee, November 12, 2009, A/C.3/64/L.27, http://www.eyeontheun.org/documents-item.asp?d=8149&id=11238 
and http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gashc3966.doc.htm.  
46  Third Committee, 12 November 2009, A/C.3/64/L.27, http://www.eyeontheun.org/documents-item.asp?d=8152&id=11241. 
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effective in dealing with incitement to hatred or discrimination based on religious grounds.47   
 
2.2.2 Developments in discourse: Language and voting pattern 
As a result of persistent pressure applied by western states and NGOs on other states to reject 
the OIC drafts, a clear change in states' behaviour among countries in the developing world has 
become apparent. In 2006 South Korea joined the dissenting group of predominantly western states. 
Since then South Korea accounts for the only state in Asia that has consecutively rejected proposed 
OIC-sponsored resolutions. Japan initially rejected the resolution while acknowledging the changes 
applied to the resolution in recent years and continuing to stress the importance of freedom of speech 
it has switched to abstaining on subsequent resolutions in the course of 2007.48 A significant change in 
the discourse was however marked by the Durban Conference in April 2009. During the conference the 
concept of defamation of religions received substantial attention, resulting in a final compromise that 
any reference to the concept of defamation of religions was to be omitted in the Final Outcome 
Document.49  
 
The Final Outcome Document recaptured the focus towards the protection of individual believers 
rather than the belief system itself. Particular emphasis was placed on the significance of freedom of 
expression in the struggle against racism, xenophobia and related intolerance.50 Paragraph 13 marked 
an initial departure from a previous exclusive focus on Islam as highlighted in OIC drafts, by introducing 
concepts of anti-Semitism, Christianophobia and anti-Arabism into the discourse.51 Nevertheless, in a 
joint statement by NGOs, a sharp critique was voiced, disagreeing with the exclusive nature of the 
‘new’ approach as the protection of believers of other religions or non-believers was simply ignored.52 
 
The overall progress however and shift towards a debate embedded within existing international 
standards was also reflected in a resolution on the Right to Freedom of Expression, which was 
presented by the USA and Egypt in September 2009. The focus of the resolution was clearly centred on 
the rights and protection of individual believers rather than a belief system.53 States and NGOs greatly 
welcomed these new advancements, and yet ARTICLE 19 expressed some reservation by commenting 
on the vagueness of paragraph four, which refers to ‘negative racial and religious stereotyping’. 
ARTICLE 19 warned that this needed to be more clearly defined in order to ensure the exclusive 
protection of the believer and not the protection of the system of belief. In the statement, the 
organisation therefore suggests that in order to refrain from any misunderstandings, the specific 
wording should be changed to ‘negative stereotyping of individuals or groups on the basis of their 
religion or race’.54 
                                                 
47 Human Rights First, ‘Focus Paper on Defamation of Religions’, March 2010: www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp.../090429-FD-hrf-
working-defam-relig.pdf; position reiterated in General Assembly's Third Committee vote on 24 November 2010: 
http://www.ishr.ch/general-assembly/964-support-for-defamation-of-religion-continues-to-decline-draft-resolution-passes-by-
only-12-votes. 
48 A/62/439/Add.2, 18 December 2007. 
49 Please refer to section 2.3.3. for a detailed discussion on all significant changes included in the Final Outcome Document. 
50 ARTICLE 19, UN Human Rights Council: Beginning of the End for Defamation of Religions?, 23 September 2009, 
http://www.article19.org/pdfs/press/un-human-rights-council-beginning-of-the-end-for-defamation-of-religions-.pdf 
 Paragraph 58 of the Durban Final Outcome Document, April 21, 2009: ‘Stresses that the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society and stresses further the role these 
rights can play in the fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance worldwide.’ 
51  Durban Final Outcome Document, Section One, para 12, 
http://www.un.org/durbanreview2009/pdf/Durban_Review_outcome_document_En.pdf. 
52  Article 19, CIHRS, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Human Rights Watch, 22 October 2009, 
http://www.article19.org/pdfs/press/open-letter-to-the-un-ad-hoc-committee-for-the-elaboration-of-complementary-.pdf. 
53 HRC, 30 September 2009, A/HRC/12/L.14/Rev.1. 
54 Article 19, ‘UN Human Rights Council: Beginning of the End for Defamation of Religions?’, 23 September, 2009, 
http://www.article19.org/pdfs/press/un-human-rights-council-article-19-calls-on-hrc-members-to-vote-against-prop.pdf.  
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In addition to a change in terminology, a clear change in states’ behaviour became visible in the overall 
voting behaviour in the UN. Lobbying work carried out by critical voices over the years seemed to have 
finally shown some effect. In a vote by the GA in December 2009, a group of Latin American countries 
including Mexico, Chile, Panama and Uruguay voted for the first time against the resolution. Brazil 
continued to abstain but strongly encouraged the necessity to maintain the debate within the existing 
legal framework, including Article 19 and 20.55   
 
The lack of support now found in the current discourse, which is elaborated on in the following 
section, is reflected in the OIC’s changes to its 2010 draft resolution to the GA. The OIC has dropped 
the restrictive terminology of ‘combating religious defamation’ in favour of ‘combating religious hatred 
and vilification of religions’ in the hope of obtaining votes from abstaining states.56 However, this new 
and seemingly softer approach has already received heavy criticism from NGOs asserting that the 
resolution continues to fail to address the protection of the individual. Like the concept of defamation 
of religions, vilification of religions has never been defined in any of the resolutions of UN human 
rights bodies and is therefore prone to abuse by restricting freedom of expression. In a 2010 joint 
statement, ARTICLE 19 and the CIHRS have argued that like the previous resolutions on defamation of 
religion, the new draft resolution is also primarily concerned about the protection of religion itself.57 
Paragraph 22 for instance ‘calls upon all states to exert the utmost efforts, in accordance with their 
national legislation and in conformity with international human rights and humanitarian law, to ensure 
that places of worship, religious places, sites, shrines and religious symbols are fully respected and 
protected.’58 While states' behaviour slowly seems to be departing from the concept advocated by OIC 
resolutions, the latest changes applied to the resolution might vary in language, but contain the same 
flaws as previous resolutions. 
 
2.3 Defamation of religions at the UN: The current consensus 
As now established, international support for the OIC-sponsored resolutions has been waning 
since a high point in 2006, despite the minor concessionary changes in language.59 This section aims to 
establish the present consensus on the concept at the UN, both in the reception of the resolutions in 
the past year and through the expressions of official opinion via various other UN fora.  
 
The 2010 resolution at the HRC in March 2010 saw its lowest margin yet, placing it just four votes from 
defeat: 20 states in favour and 17 against.60 Argentina and Zambia voted against the resolution for the 
first time, and according to the UN monitoring group, International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), 
Chile, Argentina and Mexico made strong statements during the vote that voiced their commitment to 
upholding the freedom of expression while combating all forms of intolerance.61 In November 2010 at 
                                                 
55 ISHR, ‘Support for ‘defamation of religion’ continues to decline; draft resolution passes by only 12 votes’, 25 November 2010, 
http://www.ishr.ch/general-assembly/964-support-for-defamation-of-religion-continues-to-decline-draft-resolution-passes-by-
only-12-votes. 
56 UN GA, 19 November 2010, A/C.3/65/L.46. Rev.1.  
57  ARTICLE 19 and CIHRS, UN member states should vote against proposed resolution on ‘vilification of religions, 19 November 
2010, http://www.article19.org/pdfs/press/un-ga-un-member-states-should-vote-against-proposed-resolution-on-vilificati.pdf.  
58  UN GA, 19 November 2010, A/C.3/65/L.46. Rev.1. 
59  The Becket Fund, ‘UN efforts to pass a Binding International Blasphemy Law, 2010’,Spring 2010, 
www.becketfund.org/files/international%20blaspemy%20memo.pdf. 
60  HRC, Res. 13/16, 15 April 2010, A/HRC/RES/13/16, in favour: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal 
and South Africa (20). Against: Argentina, Belgium, Chile, France, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Republic of 
Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay and Zambia (17). Abstaining: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Ghana, India, Japan, Madagascar and Mauritius (8). Angola and Gabon were absent at the vote.  
61  ISHR ‘Human Rights Council: changing dynamics on 'defamation of religions', April 14, 2010, http://www.ishr.ch/archive-
council/735-human-rights-council-changing-dynamics-on-defamation-of-religions. 
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the UN‘s Third Committee the draft resolution was also passed by a 12-vote margin (81 to 55 with 43 
abstentions), which was much lower than the previous year’s 26 (76 to 64 with 42 abstentions), and 
was upheld in December’s GA.62 Although a small number of states moved to abstain after holding 
positions against the resolution, no new states chose to support it.   
 
Both 2010 resolutions express ‘deep concern that Islam is frequently and wrongly associated with 
human rights violations and terrorism’ and directly reference the ‘special duties and responsibilities’ 
and thus the possible legal limits of free expression as contained in Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR. Yet 
as noted earlier, they do not call for the criminalisation of defamation, as requested by the OIC at the 
second session of the Ad Hoc Committee in 2009. According to the bulletin released by the 
Department of Public Information in November 2010, the issues raised in the Third Committee tracked 
similar fault lines from previous debates through the decade: there were requests from several 
delegations that there be less focus on Islam in particular.63 Albania and India expressed disapproval 
that the text continued to promote research into the link between defamation and racism; and various 
states expressed concerns for the harm the resolution could do to free expression. Focus was again 
brought to the ICCPR and also, by Finland, to the ICESCR in its appeal to states to ratify the treaties and 
consider their optional protocols. In turn, OIC states, represented by Syria, continued to stress the 
increase in ‘demonic’ portrayals of Islam and Muslims and anti-Muslim legislation, such as the 
restrictions being imposed on the construction of places of worship, and to lobby for stronger legal 
and administrative measures in response. They bolstered this appeal with references to the United 
Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and other international law provisions, including the joint 
statement by the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the OIC, and the High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union in Doha, on 7 February 2006, in which 
they underscored the need for sensitivity to the issue. 64  
 
Nevertheless the outlook for the resolution was largely unfavourable for the OIC and its supporting 
states, as reported widely by media and independent UN monitoring agencies such as the ISHR, which 
noted: 
Diminishing support for the draft resolution ironically followed more open and transparent 
negotiations this year. Though many states praised the Moroccan-led negotiations, the US 
deemed the outcome worse in terms of substance from previous years. And despite the 
EU and US urging states to find common ground through other means than the divisive 
resolution, the OIC  said it would pursue the issue ‘relentlessly’, including bringing the 
resolution to the Assembly again next year.65 
 
2.3.1 UN Special Procedures on defamation of religions  
As noted briefly above, the work of independent experts within the UN has been building an 
influential body of opinion on the subject of defamation of religions since the concept was first 
proposed in 1999. The issue has featured prominently in the reports and studies of three Special 
Rapporteurs in particular: on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance; on freedom of religion or belief; and on the promotion and protection of the right 
of freedom of opinion and expression. Although each has explored the issue in relation to his or her 
mandate, their findings and opinions have tended to align and overlap in main areas. 
                                                 
62 GA, 23 November 2010, GA/SHC/4001. 
63  Ibid. 
64 GA, Res. 61/49, 12 February 2006, A/RES/61/49. 
65 ISHR, ‘Support for ‘defamation of religion’ continues to decline; draft resolution passes by only 12 votes’, 25 November 2010, 
http://www.ishr.ch/general-assembly/964-support-for-defamation-of-religion-continues-to-decline-draft-resolution-passes-by-
only-12-votes.  
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i. On the relationship between defamation of religions and the freedom of expression 
In 2006, for example, when the defamations resolution was at the height of its support, the 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief reported on the potential threat to free expression, 
warning that ‘any attempt to lower the threshold of Article 20… would not only shrink the frontiers of 
free expression, but also limit freedom of religion or belief itself. Such an attempt could be 
counterproductive and may promote an atmosphere of religious intolerance’,66 while in 2008 the 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression reiterated that protections within this article relate ‘not 
only to comfortable, inoffensive or politically correct opinions, but also to ideas that offend, shock and 
disturb’. He also noted that laws under Article 20(2) should be clearly and narrowly defined, should not 
intrude on freedom of expression, and should be applied by an independent judiciary.67 By using 
Article 20 to draw the parameters of the provisions, the experts who have held three rapporteur 
positions during the past decade have consistently recommended that they be interpreted in light of 
Articles 18 and 19 of the ICCPR, as laid out in General Comment 10 from the HRC.68 Each Special 
Rapporteur has also expressed concerns – which have been echoed and reinforced by many NGOs – 
that the terminology and implications of the resolutions on defamation in relation to religion are 
unclear. The Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression in particular, has cited concerns that Article 
20 is meant to protect individuals, not belief systems.  
 
In 2008 the Special Rapporteur on racism, Githu Mugai, delivered a report by his predecessor Doudou 
Diene that called on member states to replace ‘defamation’ with the legal concept of ‘incitement to 
national, racial or religious hatred’, a concept which is already grounded in international legal 
instruments.69 Muigai maintained focus on the theme during his tenure, as seen during the Durban 
Review Conference in which he: ‘reiterate*d+ the recommendation of his predecessor to encourage a 
shift away from the sociological concept of the defamation of religions towards the legal norm of non-
incitement to national, racial or religious hatred’.70 In a second report on the same platform Muigai 
stressed the need for states to strike a balance between the right to freedom of expression and their 
moves to counter extremist political parties, movements and groups.71   
 
The continuity of this opinion was recently confirmed by the new Special Rapporteur on the freedom 
of religion or belief Heiner Bielefeldt. In his first interactive dialogue with the GA’s Third Committee in 
October 2010 he referred to the ‘chilling effect’ that new legal provisions, as urged by OIC 
representatives, could have on the freedom of expression. The phrase is one used frequently by UN 
Rapporteurs to express particularly strong concern.  
It is important that any limitations on freedom of expression deemed necessary to prohibit 
incitement to religious hatred be defined with the utmost diligence, precision and 
precaution. The threshold for any limitations must be very high in order not to have a 
chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of expression or other human rights. Such 
precaution is also in the interest of freedom of religion or belief, because a societal 
atmosphere of openness enhances the chances of dispelling stereotypes and prejudices. 
At the same time, freedom of religion or belief does not include the right for one’s religion 
or belief to be free from criticism or all adverse comment.72      
                                                 
66 HRC, 20 September 2006, A/HRC/2/3, para 50. 
67 HRC, 28 February 2008, A/HRC/7/14, para 66. 
68 ICCPR General Comment No. 10: Freedom of expression (Art. 19), 29 June 1983.  
69 HRC, 1 July 2009, A/HRC/12/38. 
70 Ibid, para 7. 
71  HRC, 16 April 2010, A/HRC/14/45. 
72 A statement by Heiner Bielefeldt, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief,  65th session of the General Assembly, 
Third Committee,  21 October 2010. 
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ii. On religious discourse 
Experts serving under those three UN mandates have also shared concerns for the negative 
impact that the defamation concept may have on religion. Their reports have often concluded with 
recommendations for states to promote unrestricted dialogue within and among religions.  This is a 
cause most strongly advocated by the Special Rapporteur on the freedom of religion, such as the 
often-made observation by previous mandate-holder Asma Jahangir, that ‘the  recognition, respect 
and practice of religious pluralism  . . . encompasses criticism, discussion and questioning  of each 
other’s values’,73 and that the concept of defamation of religions is dangerous because it can be used 
to legitimize blasphemy laws that ‘punish members of religious minorities, dissenting believers and 
non-theists or atheists.’74  
 
This position was reflected in the terms of the mandate itself, which was heavily debated before it was 
renewed at the Human Rights Council in 2010; the changes made upon its renewal have since been 
referred to by states in various bids to restrict and redirect the mandate holder.75 Although the terms 
of the mandate now include the condemnation of incidents of incitement to religious hatred, 
discrimination, intolerance and violence, as requested by Pakistan, consensus was not found on the 
calls for the Special Rapporteur to examine incidents of religious intolerance and to ensure respect for 
places of worship.76 This is not the only time the debate has been taken into the terms of a Special 
Rapporteur’s mandate. As noted by a 2008 report from the Quaker United Nations Office: 
 
[A] contentious thematic mandate was the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. 
This was linked to the question of religion since the controversy revolved around the limits 
to freedom of expression in relation to religion (ie, the ‘cartoons’ issue).  The mandate was 
amended by vote (27-13-3) to include reporting ‘abuse of the right to freedom of 
expression that constitutes an act of racial or religious discrimination, taking into account 
Articles 19(3) and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
General Comment No. 15 of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination… 
This amendment led to many of the original co-sponsors withdrawing their co-
sponsorship: the resolution as amended was adopted by vote (7/36; 32-0-15).77  
 
The importance of dialogue among religions has featured in the work of the other Special Rapporteurs. 
In a report on religious defamation, shortly after the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban, Special Rapporteur on racism Doudou 
Diene urged states to promote dialogue between cultures, civilizations, and religions, and to ensure 
that any efforts to combat discrimination addressed religions equally.78 In a joint statement issued a 
few years later at the Durban Review Conference, Jahangir, Maigui and La Rue warned that to legalise 
the concepts of defamation and blasphemy would make them more open to abuse.   
Whereas some have argued that defamation of religions could be equated to racism, we 
would like to caution against confusion between a racist statement and an act of 
'defamation of religion'… There are numerous examples of persecution of religious 
minorities or dissenters, but also of atheists and non-theists, as a result of legislation on 
religious offences… The right to freedom of expression constitutes an essential aspect of 
                                                 
73 HRC, 20 September 2006, A/HRC/2/3, para 65. 
74 GA, 20 August 2007, A/62/280. 
75 HRC Res. 14/11, 23 June 2010, A/HRC/RES/14/11. 
76 These terms were brought up in the 2010 interactive dialogues with the special procedures on racism and on freedom of 
religion and belief at the Third Committee, in which Ms. Jahangir’s understanding of the defamations concept was critcised and 
her successor reminded of the new terms of his mandate by Pakistan. 
77  Quaker United Nations Office: Digging Foundations or Trenches? UN Human Rights Council: Year 2, August  2008.  
78 GA, 21 August 2007, A/HRC/6/6. 
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the right to freedom of religion and belief ... essential to creating an environment in which 
a critical discussion about religion can be held. 79  
 
They later elaborated, at the same session:  
Several religions are characterised by truth claims – or even by superiority claims – which 
have been traditionally accepted as part of their theological grounds. Consequently, the 
elements that constitute a racist statement may not be the same as those that constitute a 
statement ‘defaming a religion’ as such. To this extent, the legal measures, and in 
particular the criminal measures, adopted by national legal systems to fight racism may 
not necessarily be applicable to defamation of religions.80 
 
iii. On religious intolerance 
Despite their reluctance to fully support proposals from the OIC member states on defamation 
of religions, independent experts at the UN have prominently recognised the rise of certain types of 
negative religious stereotyping in their work, and the need to urgently address this via state policy. For 
example, in the concluding recommendation of Special Rapporteur on racism, Doudou Diène’s report 
at the Durban Review Conference Report to the GA on defamation of religions and the implications of 
Islamophobia, he stresses:  
*…+ the need to pay particular attention and vigilance to maintain a careful balance 
between secularism and the respect of freedom of religion. A growing anti-religious 
culture and rhetoric is a central source of defamation of all religions and discrimination 
against their believers and practitioners. In this context governments should pay a 
particular attention to guaranteeing and protecting the places of worship and culture of all 
religions.81 
 
Asma Jahangir has similarly emphasised that although intolerant behaviour does not necessarily 
constitute a human rights violation it still tends to polarize religious groups and affect social cohesion, 
and that the judiciary should play a role in assessing whether incidents amount to violations.82 In her 
final report as Special Rapporteur on the freedom of religion in 2010, she reiterated her opinion that 
the advocacy of religious hatred should be prohibited by law,83 and although she consistently defined 
the parameters of legal action according to the provisions in existing international treaties (noting that 
she sees them as a positive alternative to blasphemy laws), the Rapporteur recommended that their 
interpretation be revisited, notably via the HRC’s General Comment No. 11 (1983) on Article 20 of the 
ICCPR.84 
 
However, expressed in this way, the Special Rapporteurs’ support for explorations into defamation as a 
legal concept has been modest in comparison to the proposals made by OIC member states and their 
supporters. The past two Special Rapporteurs on racism have promoted further examinations on 
Article 20 in their reports, stressing that the concept of incitement to religious hatred could be 
identified within an effective legal framework; they have also, perhaps more robustly, backed the 
discussions on the development of complementary standards through the CERD.85 The Special 
                                                 
79 Read by the Rapporteurs at a UN-organised side-event at the Durban Review Conference, 22 April 2009.  
80 Joint statement by the three Special Rapporteurs in summarising the conclusions of the 2008 OHCHR ‘Expert Seminar on the 
Links between Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR’, convened by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 22 April 2009. 
81  HRC, 21 August 2007, A/HRC/6/6, para 78.  
82  In the Rapporteur’s report to the HRC at its tenth session in 2009. 
83  GA, 29 July 2010, A/65//207. 
84  GA, 20 August 2007, A/62/280; HRC, 7 February 2008, A/HRC/7/10/Add.3. 
85 ,HRC, 2 September 2009, A/HRC/9/12. 
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Rapporteur on expression has restricted his recommendations to improving the implementation of 
existing provisions of the ICCPR and the ICERD.  
 
Like many of the NGOs involved in this debate, the three UN-based experts have united in their call for 
states to take a holistic approach to the discouragement of hate speech and discrimination, and to 
draw on education, community and inter-faith dialogue, and initiatives within the media, rather than 
legislation. In the two latest reports from Githu Maigui, released mid-2010 – one specifically concerned 
with the implications of Islamophobia – the Special Rapporteur on racism concluded that the most 
effective way to combat religious intolerance is to implement policy measures that deal with the ‘root 
causes’ of intolerance, which reflects his predecessor’s opinion in 2007 on ‘the need to complement 
legal strategies with an intellectual and ethical strategy relating to the processes, mechanisms and 
representations which constitute those manifestations over time’ due to their ‘historical and cultural 
depth’.86 As mentioned, religious intolerance has been an established issue of concern at the UN since 
a declaration was first drafted on the issue in 1981, and this is regularly renewed;87 it also frames much 
of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Religion.88  
 
2.3.2. The High Commissioner on Human Rights and the Secretary General 
Supporting the work of these three mandates has been that of the UN High Commissioner on 
Human Rights (HCHR) and the UN Secretary General (SG) who have initiated various surveys and 
expert consultations on religious defamation in the latter half of the past decade. A significant 
contribution by the HCHRs (firstly by Louise Arbour, and from September 2008, Navanethem Pillay) 
were special studies of laws and practices on defamation as requested by the Human Rights 
Committee, which in 2006 led to Arbour calling for a unified understanding of incitement norms in the 
ICCPR and ICERD, due to the lack of clarity on key elements such as the definitions of ‘incitement’, 
‘hostility’, and ‘hatred’.89  Reporting to the HRC in 2007, the HCHR stressed the need for enhanced 
cooperation and stronger political will by member states in combating defamation of religions’, and 
this led to further consultations and reports. A 2008 survey among states led the HCHR to confirm that 
their understandings of the term ‘defamation’ addressed ‘somewhat different phenomena and 
appl*ied+ various terms such as contempt, ridicule, outrage and disrespect to connote defamation’.90 
The Commissioner’s work has highlighted the grey areas that remain between the criticism of religion, 
the persecution of religious persons and the concept of religious defamation.  
The call for holistic measures has been recently amplified meanwhile, by the SG, who rather than 
recommending legal responses to defamation, has chosen to root the debate in the wider theme of 
religious intolerance, and to back recommendations by UN Independent Experts.91 In a July 2009 
report to the GA the SG noted that ‘*i+n order to tackle the root causes of intolerance, a much broader 
set of policy measures needs to be addressed covering the areas of intercultural dialogue as well as 
education for tolerance and diversity’. This call for holistic measures has boosted the UN’s attempt to 
address the issue of religious intolerance via a global programme of seminars and workshops such as 
one held in June 2009 entitled ‘Unlearning Intolerance’ which addressed the dangers of ‘cyberhate’ 
and ‘digital demonisation’.92 The SG’s report on defamation listed the interaction of the HCHR with the 
issue in various fora during the past few years, such as a press release expressing regret at 
                                                 
86 GA, 21 August 2007, A/HRC/6/6 , para 78 
87 Such as Resolution 64/164 adopted in the Human Rights Council on 17 March 2010. 
88 The mandate title was originally UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, and was changed to the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief by the UN Human Rights Commission and the UN General Assembly in 2000. 
89 HRC, 20 September 2006, A/HRC/2/6. 
90 HRC,12 September 2008, A/HRC/9/7, para 67; see also HRC, 5 September 2008, A/HRC/9/25. 
91 GA, 31 July 2009, A/64/209. 
92 These and others are listed in the report of the UN HCHR on ‘The implementation of Human Rights Council resolution 10/22 
entitled ‘Combating defamation of religions’, HRC, 11 January 2010 A/HRC/13/57. 
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Switzerland’s ban on minarets, and an address expressing concern at the discriminatory nature of 
profiling at the Counter Terrorism Committee of the Security Council.  He and the HCHR have also 
noted that jurisprudence has also been building in the Human Rights Committee regarding the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and ICERD, and the latest report of the HCHR features various cases 
taken by claimants alleging incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. Although most claims 
have failed, there have been dissenting opinions.93    
 
2.3.3 The Durban Review Conference and the Ad Hoc Group 
As well as being reflected in the language of UN resolutions, this body of opinion has been 
influential in the drafting of other reports, such as the Outcome Document of the April 2009 Durban 
Review Conference and the Draft Resolution on the right to freedom of expression, co-sponsored by 
the USA and Egypt and passed later that same year.94  Both saw the marked softening of language 
relating to incitements and defamation proposed by the OIC, instead invoking terms such as ‘negative 
stereotyping’, drawn from the ICCPR. UN experts, among them the Special Rapporteur on racism and 
the HCHR, have opined that the consensus reached in the Outcome Document was a satisfying 
balance, reaffirming both the importance of freedom of expression and the need to curb hate speech. 
The HCHR has recommended that the language of the document be used by policymakers to define 
domestic measures.95 Nevertheless the Outcome Document was recognised as having given particular 
weight to the issue in the eight references it made to incitement, and in the Intergovernmental 
Working Group that was established at the close of the conference to look into the content and scope 
of a possible Optional Protocol to the ICERD, and which gave rise to the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Complementary Standards. Although its meeting in late 2009 was reported as being more constructive 
than its first session, progress was minor, and EU states continue to oppose OIC states on the need for 
complementary standards. A third meeting planned for the end of 2010 has been postponed until 
early 2011. 
 
2.3.4. General Comment 34 on Article 19 
This debate continues among the drafting committee members of the Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment No. 34 on Article 19 of the ICCPR (hereafter General Comment 34), to 
further safeguard the right to freedom of opinion and expression.96 The first draft, completed in 
October 2010, discusses the acceptable limitations on the right to expression, stressing that to 
criminalise the holding of an opinion violates human rights norms. In general terms, draft General 
Comment 34 notes that any limitations must be justified and with proof of a clear threat, that 
imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty for any form of defamation and that all such criminal 
laws should be repealed unless they are applicable under Article 20. It also draws attention to anti-
discrimination content in the Committee’s General Comment No. 22, urging states to base their action 
‘on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition’ when citing actions taken in the 
protection of morals.97 The committee is brief in its reference to blasphemy, listing the international 
legal limitations on its criminalisation without further interpretation, and stressing that any criminal 
law provisions that do not comply with Article 20 should be repealed. It does note that blasphemy laws 
should apply to adherents of all religions equally, and should not be used to prevent commentary on 
religious doctrine.  
                                                 
93 Ibid. The report refers to cases such as Vassilariat al  V. Greece, Communication No. 1570/2007, CCPR/C/95/D/1570/2007 
(2009);  and Kasem Said Ahmad and Asmaa Abdol-Hamid v. Denmark, Communication No. 1487/2006, which both invoked 
Article 20 of the ICCPR.  
94  See Sections 1 and 2.2 
95  HRC, 1 July 2009, A/HRC/12/38. 
96  HRC, 25 November 2010, CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.5.  
97  UN CCPR General Comment No. 22, ‘ The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18)’, adopted   on 30 June 
1993, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4. 
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General Comments are a way for the UN committees to assist and promote the article of the covenant, 
ease conflicts of interpretation and highlight de facto insufficiencies that may have come to light in 
reports to the body, and are cited by organisations and in judicial decisions.98 As it stands, General 
Comment 34 reflects agreement with the recommendations made by UN independent experts and a 
lack of support for moves to prohibit forms of defamation relating to religion. However this language 
will likely be challenged, and may see some change when the draft is put to state parties in 2011. 
                                                 
98  Boyle, ‘Soft Law in International Law-making’ in Evans (ed) International law, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York: 2006 
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Section 3: Case studies from three OIC States 
3.1. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has a majority Muslim population and has passed some of the 
world’s strictest national laws on blasphemy and the defamation of religion. Its provisions are 
established in the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), its Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and its constitution. 
Many of these provisions were introduced or strengthened between 1977 and 1988 during the reign of 
military dictator Zia ul-Haq, who is known for his ‘Islamisation’ of the country, mostly under martial 
law.99 Under General Zia, Shari'a Benches were established in the high courts and the Supreme Court 
(which had the jurisdiction to examine the compliance of domestic laws with Islamic law, even if no 
complaint was brought before them), and new ordinances reset the parameters of punishment for 
various offences, including expressions of disrespect to Islamic symbols, the prophet Muhammad, and 
his family members and companions.100 One ordinance in particular, Ordinance XX of 1984, amended 
the PPC to single out the unorthodox Muslim minority group, the Ahmadis, for particular punishment 
should they ‘outrage the religious feelings of *Pakistan’s mainstream+ Muslims’.101 Few amendments 
have been made since, and attempts to do so have been met with strong and often aggressive 
opposition from the state’s powerful conservative religious organisations, as mentioned later in this 
report. Non-Muslim judges are rare in the state, although there have been exceptions, such as the 
appointment of Hindu acting Chief Justice of Pakistan, Rana Bhagwandas, in 2007 (now retired) and of 
a Christian high court judge, Jamshaid Rehmatullah, in 2009.102  
 
The following section on Pakistan will present an overview of the state’s laws on religious defamation 
and blasphemy, including recent amendments and aspects of the national debate on the repeal of the 
legislation. It will then examine the use of these laws in five recent cases, while analysing the extent to 
which the freedom of expression and other fundamental rights and freedoms are protected. The 
section aims to identify whether Pakistan’s laws comply or conflict with its obligations under 




Blasphemy laws in the PPC are constitutionally supported by a number of articles in the 1973 
Constitution of Pakistan among them Article 2, which declares that ‘Islam shall be the state religion of 
Pakistan’ and Article 31 which provides for an ‘Islamic way of life’. 103 It should be noted that Article 33, 
though brief, requires that ‘the state shall discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial 
                                                 
99  ‘Muhammad Zia ul-Haq’ in GlobalSecurity.org (a US-based source of background information and developing news stories in 
the fields of defense, space, intelligence, WMD, and homeland security). 
100 Ḥaqqānī, Pakistan: between mosque and military, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Lahore, Vanguard Books, 
2005. 
101  Ordinance No. XX of 1984, which was passed ‘to amend the law to prohibit the Quadiani group, Lahori group and Ahmadis 
from indulging in anti-Islamic activities’ included the addition of new section 298C to The Pakistan Penal Code Act XLV of 1860, 
as featured in the following section. www.pakistani.org  
102  ASSIST News Service (ANS), ‘Christian lawyer appointed as High Court Judge following efforts of Pakistan Minorities Minister’, 
28 February 2009, http://www.assistnews.net/Stories/2009/s09020176.htm.   
103  Article 3 states:  
Islamic way of life: (1) Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan, individually and collectively, to order their lives in 
accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled 
to understand the meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah.  
 (2) The state shall endeavour, as respects the Muslims of Pakistan, :  
 (a) to make the teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat compulsory, to encourage and facilitate the learning of Arabic 
language and to secure correct and exact printing and publishing of the Holy Quran; 
 (b) to promote unity and the observance of the Islamic moral standards; and 
 (c) to secure the proper organisation of zakat, [ushr,] auqaf and mosques. 
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prejudices among the citizens.’  
 
The Penal Code 1860 and the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 
The PPC lays down the nature of offences under the law, along with their punishments, while the CrPC 
is largely procedural, providing machinery for the punishment. The two codes are read together. 
 
Chapter XV of the PPC relates to ‘offences relating to religion’ and two of its articles cover blasphemy 
and defamation of Islam: 295 addresses the defiling or ‘defaming’ of sacred texts, symbols or persons, 
with each crime defined by the wrongdoer’s action and intent. Article 295-C, however, specifically 
reserves the harshest punishment against those who make derogatory remarks against the Prophet; 
Article 298 governs derogatory remarks against persons holding religious office, and the misuse or 
‘misrepresentation’ of the faith, particularly by non Orthodox Muslims.104   
They read as follows: 
  
295-A. Injuring or defiling place of worship, with Intent to insult the religion of any class: 
Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any 
class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or 
with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction damage or 
defilement as an insult to their religion shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 
 
295-B. Defiling, etc, of copy of Holy Quran:  
Whoever will fully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Quran or of an extract 
there from or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable 
for imprisonment for life. 
 
295-C. Use of derogatory remarks, etc; in respect of the Holy Prophet:  
Whoever by words, either spoken or written or by visible representation, or by any imputation, 
innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet 
Mohammed (PBUH) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be 
liable to fine. 
 
298. Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings: 
Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person, utters 
any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person or makes any gesture in the sight of 
that person or places any object in the sight of that person, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, or 
with both. 
 
298-A. Use of derogatory remarks, etc..., in respect of holy personages: 
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any 
imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly defiles a sacred name of any wife 
(Ummul Mumineen), or members of the family (Ahle-bait), of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), or any 
of the righteous caliphs (Khulafa-e-Rashideen) or companions (Sahaaba) of the Holy Prophet 
description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 
Misuse of epithet, descriptions and titles, etc. Reserved for certain holy personages or places.  
Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis or by any 
                                                 
104  296 and 297 are not related to blasphemy, but provide for the interruption of religions events and the trespassing on religious 
property, respectively. 
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other name) who by words, either spoken or written or by visible representation:  
refers to or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of the Holy Prophet 
Mohammad (PBUH), as "Ameerul Momneen", "Khalifat-ul-Momneen", "Khalifat-ul-
Muslimeen", "Sahaabi" or "Razi Allah Anho";  
refers to or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), 
as Ummul-Mumineen;  
refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (Ahle-Bait) of the Holy 
Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), as Ahle-Bait; or  
refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (Ahle-Bait) of the Holy 
Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), as Ahle-Bait; or  
refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as Masjid; shall be punished with 
imprisonment or either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also 
be liable to fine.  
Any person of the Qadiani group or Lahore group, (who call themselves Ahmadis or by any 
other names), who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, refers to 
the mode or from of call to prayers followed by his faith as "Azan" or redites Azan as used by 
the Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which  
may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 
 
298-C. Persons of Qadiani group, etc, calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his 
faith: 
 Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis or any 
other name), who directly or indirectly, posses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his 
faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by 
words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or in any manner whatsoever 
outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.105 
 
International Treaties 
Pakistan holds a seat on the UN Human Rights Committee and has ratified most of the core 
international human rights treaties. It newly ratified the ICCPR in June 2010, though with reservations 
which declare that the provisions of Articles 3, 6, 7, 18 and 19 shall be applied to the extent that they 
are not repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution of Pakistan and the Shari'a laws. It did not 
ratify the Optional Protocol. Pakistan is also party to the ICERD, the Convention Against Torture (CAT; 
also recently acceded to in June 2010), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).106  
 
 
3.1.2 Amendments to the law 
In October 1990 the Federal Shari'a Court (FSC), which rules on the conformity of laws with the 
injunctions of Islam, ruled that Section 295-C of the PPC was repugnant to the religion because it did 
not deliver the death penalty for acts of contempt against the Prophet. The FSC ruled that 295-C would 
be amended by the ruling unless the president took action to have the law amended by April of the 
following year.107 The only appeal to the Supreme Court, by a Christian bishop in 1990, was addressed 
                                                 
105  Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), Act XLV of 1860, 6 October 1860, www.pakistani.org.  
106  HRC, 26 March 2008, A/HRC/WG.6/1/DZA/2.  
107   Rebecca J. Dobras, ‘Is the United Nations Endorsing Human Rights Violations? An Analysis of the United Nations’ Combating 
Defamation of Religions Resolutions and Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws’, 37 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 340 2008-2009; The Indian, ‘Pak 
SC rejects petition-challenging death as the only punishment for blasphemy’, 22 April 2009, 
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/pak-sc-rejects-petition-challenging-death-as-the-only-punishment-for-
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and dismissed by the Shari'a Appellate Bench of the court in 2009 because the appellant was no longer 
alive. The death sentence thus stands, however no judicial executions have yet taken place under this 
law due to a combination of delay, appeals, and pardons. 108 Since his election President Zardari has 
made use of his constitutionally authorised power to pardon accused persons, and he and his party, 
The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) are seen as moderately sympathetic to religious minorities. However 
as noted by critics, 109 the arbitrary use of presidential pardons is no replacement for the repeal of 
weak or discriminatory laws, and should by no means be used as a legal safeguard.110 
 
There have been various attempts to lighten this sentence since, due to claims – detailed in the 
analysis and cases below – that they are frequently misused, yet these have been met by fierce and 
largely effective political and popular resistance from powerful conservative religious organisations (as 
has the use of presidential pardons). One criminal law amendment was successfully passed in 2004, 
which increased the responsibility of the police to investigate the legitimacy of a charge under 295-
C.111 Under this amendment no case of blasphemy can be legally filed without a thorough investigation 
by an officer ranking no lower than the superintendent of police [see Annex I]. 112 
 
3.1.3. Implementation 
According to data collected by the National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP),113 a 
human rights body patronised by the Pakistan Catholic Bishops' Conference, at least 964 persons have 
been charged with violating these anti-blasphemy clauses between 1986 and August 2009 in Pakistan, 
while more than 30 such persons were killed extra-judicially.114 Approximately half of those charged 
were minorities – Christian, Hindu and Ahmadi – which only make up about 3% of the population, 115 
leading to the strong and often cited accusations that the laws are used as a tool of persecution by 
civilians and officials. The law has been criticised for being too general and requiring too little proof, 
with procedures that are disproportionate to the severity of the sentence, and little regulation to 
ensure that correct procedures are followed. Extreme concerns have been put forward from minority 
rights defenders, including NGOS such as Human Rights Watch and experts within the UN.116 While 
                                                                                                                                                                  
blasphemy_100183053.html.  
108  BBC Online, ‘Pakistani Christian Asia Bibi has price on her head', 7 December 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-
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Combating Defamation of Religions Resolutions and Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws’, 37 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 340 2008-2009.  
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office in Lahore, Pakistan and Associate Counsel with the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) based in Virginia; in’ 
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or commute any sentence passed by any court, tribunal or other authority.’ 
111  Act 1 of 2005 The Criminal Law Amendment ACT 2004, published in Pakistan Law Journal (PLJ) 2005 Federal Shriat Court, p. 207 
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112  As referenced in ‘Sherry Rehman: "I believe the repeal option is still the best one, but…”’ The News, December  2010,  
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113  The NCJP was formed in 1985 by the Pakistan Catholic Bishops’ Conference: http://www.ncjppk.org/ 
114  Huffington Post, ‘Institutionalized discrimination against religious minorities’, 10 December 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-buckwalterpoza/pakistans-institutionaliz_b_794230.html. 
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Students), Dominicans for Justice and Peace – the Order of Preachers, non-governmental organizations in special consultative 
status’, to the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/12/NGO/14,  4 September 2009. 
116  Human Rights Watch, ‘Pakistan: Massacre of Minority Ahmadis’, 31 May 2010, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/05/31/pakistan-massacre-minority-ahmadis, Human Rights Watch commented that the 
blasphemy law and the government’s failure to address religious persecution by extremist groups effectively enables atrocities 
against minorities. 
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visiting Pakistan in 1995, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief declared: ‘*…+ 
blasphemy as an offence against belief may be subject to special legislation. However, such legislation 
should not be discriminatory and should not give rise to abuse. Nor should it be so vague to jeopardize 
human rights especially those of minorities’117 Similarly, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, in response to a Pakistan state party report in 2009, ‘expressed its concern about 
reported infringements of the right to freedom of religion and the risk that blasphemy laws may be 
used in a discriminatory manner against religious minority groups, who may also be members of ethnic 
minorities’ and ‘recalled state party’s obligations on freedom of thought, conscience and religion’.118 
 
However many non-minority Muslims have begun to be accused and jailed via this law, often amid 
claims of personal grievance and property disputes (which also often accompany minority cases).  In 
media reports from 2010 the Federal Minister for Human Rights, Syed Mumtaz Alam Gilani, reported 
an increase in Muslims using the laws to settle scores with fellow Muslims while chairperson Dr. Mehdi 
Hasan of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), an NGO, has said that around 80% of 
blasphemy charges are false and have arisen ‘because of property issues or other personal or family 
vendetta’.119  This was a major reason for the 2004 amendment to the criminal law cited above, which 
places stricter conditions on arrest procedures for blasphemy. Yet human rights organisations such as 
Human Rights Watch and the AHRC claim that these are rarely observed, and that police officers 
continue to bow to pressure from religious conservatives, particularly in rural areas, as indicated by 
the cases listed below.120   
 
Finally it is important to know that vigilantism is of extreme concern in the Pakistan context, as 
demonstrated in the number of extra judicial deaths and unprosecuted murders of persons on trial for 
blasphemy, often during mob violence. As previously mentioned, at least 30 persons connected with 
cases of blasphemy have been murdered since 1986. This challenges one of the main arguments in 
support of the amendment of 295-C: that it would prevent private citizens from taking the law into 
their own hands and killing blasphemy suspects.121 State protection for suspected blasphemers is often 
inadequate and although they are routinely detained in separate cells to protect them from cell mates, 
several people accused of blasphemy have been killed in jail. The death toll has also included relatives 
of the accused and even members of the judiciary involved in blasphemy cases. NGOs report that 
those who have served sentences or been acquitted of blasphemy charges are usually forced into 
hiding, or will claim asylum (Ahmadis make up a substantial proportion of successful asylum claims 
from Pakistan, often on claims of religious persecution). Impunity is common for Muslim civilians or 
police officers who harass, threaten or harm persons accused of blasphemy, and the slandering of 
blasphemy victims by other civilians, even when illegal – such as cases in which the loud speakers of 
Mosques are illegally used, or when death threats are published in newspapers – receives little or no 
                                                 
117  CHR, 2 January 1996, E/CN.4/1996/95.Add.1, Para 82. 
118  CERD, 16 March 2009, CERD/C/PAK/CO/20, Para 19. 
119  The Express Tribune, ‘Blasphemy laws: 58% of women booked are Muslims’, 1 December 2010, 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/84133/blasphemy-laws-58-of-women-booked-are-muslims. 
120   Human Rights Watch, ‘Pakistan: Repeal Blasphemy Laws’, 23 November 2010; 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/22/pakistan-repeal-blasphemy-law; AHRC, ‘PAKISTAN: The Christian community in 
Punjab is under threat from extremist groups again; two brothers are illegally charged with blasphemy’, 14 July 2010, 
http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2010/3503/. 
121  Jinnah Institute, ‘Briefing Pack’ on: Amendments to the Blasphemy Laws Act 2010, http://www.jinnah-
institute.org/images/ji%20briefing%20pack%20amendments%20to%20the%20blasphemy%20laws.pdf; ‘Blasphemy Law 
Revisted’ by I.A. Rehman, The Dawn, 29 July 2010, forwarded by the Asian Human Rights Commission:  
      ‘In a preface to ‘Namoos-i-Risalat’, an account of the making of 295-C by Advocate Ismail Qureshi, (Al Faisal 
Publishers, Lahore, 1994), former Supreme Court judge and former president Rafiq Tarar declared: ‘If this law is 
not there the doors to courts will be closed on the culprits and the petitioners provoked by them, and then 
everyone will take the law in his own hands and exact revenge from the criminals. As a result anarchy will prevail 
in the country.’ The article also noted that in 1994 the Lahore High Court declared that if Section 295-C of the PPC 
were struck down, ‘the old system of killing a culprit on the spot could be revived’. 
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attention from police, though they commonly precede deadly attacks.122 
 
i. Current developments 
In November 2010 parliamentarian Shehrbano ‘Sherry’ Rehman proposed the Amendments to 
the Blasphemy Laws Act 2010 in the National Assembly of Pakistan, citing Article 25 of the Pakistan 
Constitution, which aims for equal protection of all citizens under the law. 123 The Act details sweeping, 
strong amendments to the two statutory codes, the PPC and CrPC, which would firstly lighten the 
penalties of blasphemy, and secondly, increase the responsibility of the complainant and allow for the 
punishment of ‘those making false or frivolous allegations’ under section 295’ or who give rise to ‘any 
advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination or violence an offence.’ 
Expressing concerns about the strength of Pakistan’s Session Courts, Rehman also suggested that 
complaints be tried by high courts to ‘strengthen the possibility for justice… under a higher degree of 
public scrutiny.’124  Other amendments include the suggestion that a ten-year sentence be reduced to 
two years under Section 295-A, and that imprisonment to life be reduced to a sentence of up to five 
years or a fine.125  
 
Rehman proposes that the amendments will act as a safeguard against the misuse of the laws, and 
ensure the protection of Pakistan’s minorities and ‘vulnerable citizens, who routinely face judgments 
and verdicts at the lower courts where mob pressure is often mobilized to obtain a conviction’. She 
also used, as further justification, the fact that the laws were ‘man-made’ and introduced via ‘a 
dictator’s Ordinance, without parliamentary consultation or public debate.’ 126 Ordinances in Pakistan 
are temporary legal devices.   
 
In November 2010, the Minister for Minorities Shahbaz Bhatti announced that although the repeal of 
the laws was not being considered, ‘we are considering changing it so that misuse of the law should be 
stopped.’ 127 However in early December, member of parliament, Aziz Baig, submitted a citizen's 
petition which argued that lawmakers did not have the constitutional right to amend laws that related 
to religion, and Judge Khwaja Mohammad Sharif has ordered the bill to be frozen while the court 
assesses the legislative authority of parliament over blasphemy laws.128 The response from many of 
the country’s orthodox religious groups has also been extremely strong, with ten religious parties 
organizing a nationwide protest against any possible amendment of the blasphemy laws, in December 
2010.129 Rehman herself has been named in various fatwas since she proposed the amendment to the 
                                                 
122  Section 3 of Loud Speaker Act 1965 bans all types of speeches other than Azan (the call to prayer) and the Friday sermon in 
Arabic, as noted by the AHRC, ‘PAKISTAN: The killing of two Christian brothers is the result of the negligence and bias of the 
Punjab government and police,’ 20 July 2010, http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2010statements/2693/. 
123  The Amendments to the Blasphemy Laws Act 2010 can be read at the Jinnah Institute’s website: http://www.jinnah-
institute.org.  
124 ‘Sherry Rehman: ‘I believe the repeal option is still the best one, but…’ The News, December 2010, 
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2010-weekly/nos-12-12-2010/dia.htm#5.  
125  Ibid. 
126  Ibid.  
127  All Voices media (online media outlet), ‘Pakistani Government will not repeal blasphemy law: minister for Minorities’, 
November 23 2010, http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/7416694-pakistani-government-will-not-repeal-blasphemy-
law-minister-for-minorities/images. 
128  South Asia News, ‘Pakistani court blocks government drive to relax blasphemy laws’, 6 December 2010, 
http://wwrn.org/articles/?place=pakistan. 
129 The Dawn, ‘Religious parties to strike against amendment in blasphemy law’, 19 December 2010, 
http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/19/religious-parties-to-strike-against-amendment-in-blasphemy-law.html: ‘Speaking at a 
press conference, Secretary General of Jamaat-e-Islami, Liaquat Baloch, said that a nationwide strike will be observed on 31 
December. Baloch said that a rally and protest will also observed in Karachi on 9th January. He said that a calculated conspiracy 
is on the way to change the Islamic law in the country. Secretary information, of Jamiat Ulema Islam (F), Maulana Amjad Khan 
said that the president and prime minister should take action against Sherry Rehman for the amendment bill against the 
blasphemy law in the national assembly.’ 
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Act.130  
 
Although human rights and minorities rights advocates have welcomed the move to amend the laws, 
the proposed reforms do not extend to the explicit criminalisation of Ahmadi activities (298-B and C). 
Furthermore many argue that repealing the laws will not be enough to ensure lasting change. As one 
commentator, journalist and documentary film maker Beena Sarwar opined in an article published by 
the AHRC: 
 
The fanatical and misguided mindset cultivated over the past few decades will not 
disappear by simply repealing 295-C, although this must be done. Embarking on a 
sensible education policy is also a long-term step that must be taken to stop the rot 
…The political leadership is responsible for providing police with the training, means and 




A. The case of Aasia Bibi  
Ms. Aasia Bibi, 45, of Ittan Wali in Sheikhpura district, Punjab province, was sentenced to death by a 
district and session court judge in Nankana on 8 November 2010 on charges of committing blasphemy 
in violation of Section 295-B and 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code; she was also fined Rs300,000.132 
Aasia is a Christian and the case has been strongly taken up by Christian and other minority activists in 
campaigning against the misuse of the blasphemy laws, as well as by orthodox Muslims who support 
it.133 The Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, was assassinated on 4 January 2010 allegedly due to his 
public support of her case and opposition to blasphemy laws, as detailed in the following section.   
 
The defendant, an allegedly illiterate farm worker and part of the only Christian family in her village, 
was accused of having defamed the Prophet Muhammad on 14 June 2009 in front of Muslim 
neighbours. According to details of the case as reported widely in the media, the women were 
involved in a dispute over the collection of water, as well as a small but longer running property 
dispute.134 Five days after the incident a local Muslim leader, Qari Salim, began to publicly announce 
that Aasia had committed blasphemy, and reportedly used the loudspeakers of his mosque to 
disseminate this judgement and incite a vigilante attack, which though illegal, was not responded to by 
police.135 Following this, Aasia alleged that she was badly beaten by other civilians in the village.136 
Although she was initially taken by the Saddar police into protective custody from the scene of the 
                                                 
130  Daily Times, ‘Proposing amends in blasphemy laws’, 9 January 2011, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/?page=2011\01\09\story_9-1-2011_pg1_1. 
131  The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), ‘Blasphemy laws - Stopping the rot’, 16 November 2010, 
http://www.humanrights.asia/opinions/columns/AHRC-ETC-040-2010. 
132  From various news reports, among them Spero News, ‘Pakistan: Concern grows for Christian accused of blasphemy’, 25 
November 2010, http://www.speroforum.com/a/43899/Pakistan-Concern-grows-for-Christian-accused-of-blasphemy. 
133  On 9 December 2010 the details of this case were narrated and used by Pakistan Christian Congress leader, Dr. Nazir Bhatti, 
speaking at a Human Rights Day event at the National Press Club in Washington, to call for the repeal of Pakistan’s blasphemy 
laws, and to urge the ‘UN General Assembly member states and their representatives in United Nations Human Right Council 
UNHRC to re-consider their stance on ‘Defamation of Religion’ resolution, presented by Pakistan on behalf of Organization of 
Islamic Countries, prepared by Egypt and seconded by U.S.A., in present situation of religious minorities in Islamic States 
because Pakistan wants to globalize blasphemy law’, http://www.pakistanchristiancongress.org/contents.php?section_id=44.  
134  Ibid.  
135  Section 3 of the Loud Speaker Act 1965 prohibits the use of mosque loudspeakers for anything other than Section 3 of the 
Loudspeaker Act 1965 bans all types of speeches other than Azan (the call to prayer) and the Friday sermon in Arabic, as noted 
in AHRC, ‘PAKISTAN: The Christian community in Punjab is under threat from extremist groups again; two brothers are illegally 
charged with blasphemy’, 14 July 2010, http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2010/3503/. 
136  BBC, ‘Pakistani Christian Asia Bibi 'has price on her head', 7 December 2010. 
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beating, charges of blasphemy (295 B and C) were filed against her in a First Information Report (FIR; a 
procedural requirement for a criminal case to proceed to court) on 19 June 2010 by the Imam, and no 
action was taken against her assailants. Aasia has since claimed that she did not meet with any lawyers 
in jail, and was not accompanied by a lawyer on the day of her verdict.137  
 
On 1 November 2010, after Aasia had been in remand (mostly at a prison in Sheikhupura) for more 
than a year, Judge Naveed Iqbal at the court of Sheikhupura, Punjab, "totally ruled out" the possibility 
of false implication, saw "no mitigating circumstances", and sentenced her to death by hanging, also 
imposing a fine of the equivalent to US$1,100.138 Her lawyer, SK Shahid, filed an appeal at the Lahore 
High Court on 19 November and requested a pardon from the Office of the President; President Asif Ali 
Zardari reportedly asked for a review of the facts of the case from the Pakistani Minister for Minority 
Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti. 139 On 29 November Khawaja Mohammad Sharif, the chief justice of the Lahore 
High Court, issued an interim order ruling that while the matter is pending before it, the president may 
not issue a pardon for Asia Bibi.140  
 
Critics such as the AHRC have noted that the case relied only upon Muslim witnesses for the 
prosecution, and that the investigation was carried out by a low ranking Assistant Sub-Inspector, 
rather than at least a Superintendent of Police (SP), as required by criminal procedural law since 
2004.141  Pakistan’s National Commission on the Status of Women has also expressed shock over the 
sentence. Referring to the claim, by Aasia’s lawyers, that the ‘eyewitnesses’ were not present at the 
time of the allegedly blasphemous incident, Rana Sanaullah, the Punjab Minister of Law, stated that ‘in 
cases like this of false witnesses, once proof of bad faith has been established, the same penalty 
should be imposed as that suffered by the innocent victims of false charges.’142  
 
Aasia is currently in isolation in Sheikhupura prison, facing threats against her life inside and outside of 
the prison. Asylum has reportedly been offered to her by the Canadian and Italian governments.143  
 
Additional information: 
An aggressive public campaign in support of a guilty verdict and death sentence was waged outside the 
court house throughout the trial, reportedly led by Qari Yaqub, of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (which DOHI News 
and other media sources have reported as being blacklisted by the UN for suspected terrorist links); 
this involved the public offer of a reward by a Muslim cleric for the defendant’s assassination, which 
was widely carried by media but reportedly not credibly investigated by police.144 At least one daily 
national newspaper, Nawa-i-Waqt has written an editorial in support of his proposal.145 It has been 
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141  Pakistan Daily Times, ‘Blasphemy cases only after SP’s investigation’, 31 July 2004, 
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142 Door of Hope International, DOHI-News, ‘Imam calls for beheading of Asia Bibi No Presidential pardon’, 2 August 2010, 
http://www.dohi.org/us/printableproddetail.asp?prod=120810. 
143  Ibid. 
144  AHRC, ‘PAKISTAN: Muslim leaders who issued decree to kill a Christian woman should be prosecuted ‘, 8 December 2009, 
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largest in the Khyber Pakhtoon Kha), told a rally in the north-western town of Peshawar that his mosque would give Rs500,000 
(US$5,700) to anyone who killed Aasia Bibi.  
145  The editor announced and supported the ‘reward’ for the assassination in the ‘Sar-e-Raahay’ or editor’s note on 5 December 
2010, which was reprinted in a critical report by Muhammad Amjad Rashid on 20 December 2010 in syndicated blog, by the 
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reported that representatives of religious organisation Aalmi Majlas-e-Tahuffuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuat 
(AMTKN) have threatened the government with a countrywide protest if the accused is shown any 
clemency by the presidency, and if there are any moves to amend the blasphemy laws.146 
 
Critics of the decision, among them the AHRC and Asma Jahangir, who is the president of Supreme 
Court Bar Association and the former UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, have 
noted that the judge in this case appeared to be courting popularity with his comments throughout 
the hearing and the verdict.147 The late Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, initially met Aasia in jail 
after her sentencing and assured her that he would take her case before the president of Pakistan, 
advocating her pardon. He then reported harassment by pro-blasphemy law groups such as the 
country’s most influential Sunni Muslim alliance, the Sunni Ittehad Council,148 shortly before his 
assassination on 4 January in Lahore; he is the most high profile figure to be murdered in Pakistan 
since former leader Benazir Bhutto was killed, and is believed to have been killed by a member of his 
state appointed security team because of his public stand against the blasphemy laws.149 His death has 
sparked both angry riots and strong messages of public support; Time Magazine reports that a 
Facebook fan page was set up for his suspected killer shortly after the incident. When Pakistan's 
Minister for Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti, raised the issue six months ago, he also claims that he was 
threatened with death.150 Debates within the provincial assembly of Punjab have reportedly given a 
greater platform for rhetoric that supports Section 295 of the PPC, and much less space for dissenting 
opinion.151  This mirrors the path of the blasphemy laws themselves, as recently noted by local news 
editor, Qurat ul ain Siddiqui who states that:‘with the international community ramping up pressure 
on the government to pardon Aasia and to eventually repeal the blasphemy laws, certain otherwise 
antagonistic clerics from the Barelvi and Deobandi schools of thought have come together to caution 
President Asif Ali Zardari over going ahead with the pardon saying the move may lead to “untoward 
repercussions”.’152 The defendant’s husband and children went into hiding after having been chased, 
harassed and threatened in their community, and have not been provided with protection from the 
state.153  
                                                                                                                                                                  
‘Critical Supporters of Pakistan People’s Party’ (CSPPP), under the title ‘Nawa-i-Waqt is promoting religious extremism’ , 
http://criticalppp.com/archives/32157. 
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The path of this case demonstrates the distinct lack of safeguards in place in Pakistan which throws the 
chance of a fair trial for a minority defendant is thrown into severe doubt, namely due to the failure to 
ensure the protection of the judiciary, lawyers and policy makers from popular pressure and any 
accompanying aggression. Although as of January 2011 the defendant has been imprisoned in isolation 
in remand prison for her safety, she remains extremely vulnerable, as do her family. By failing to legally 
address the mob violence perpetrated against Aasia Bibi, to investigate the public calls for her death by 
individuals and in the media, or to arrange for official state protection for her family, the state is being 
seen to extend impunity for these crimes, which will serve to encourage vigilante attacks against 
accused blasphemers and minorities. By doing so Pakistan fails in its positive obligations under the 
ICCPR and other international instruments to prevent, punish and protect citizens from discrimination 
and religious persecution, as detailed in the conclusion to this section. 154 
 
B. The case of Rashid and Sajid Emmanuel 
Rashid and Sajid Emmanuel were shot dead by unknown assailants on the grounds of a Faisalabad 
courthouse in Punjab on 19 July 2010 during their trial on blasphemy charges, while in handcuffs and 
in police custody.  The men, members of the minority Christian community, had been assigned 
minimal police protection despite the escalating violence of riots in the area that had called for their 
execution.  The case became a rallying cry for Christian and minority rights activists, many calling for 
the repeal of the blasphemy laws.  
 
Rashid Emmanuel, 32, was a pastor and his younger brother was an MBA student; both men were 
Christian and lived in a largely Christian community, Daud Nagar in Warispura. On 2 July Rashid was 
arrested by at least ten uniformed policemen and taken to the Civil Lines Police Station, where he was 
accused of having published a four-page handwritten pamphlet that criticised Islam and the Prophet 
Muhammad.155 The photocopy that he was shown appeared to bear his and his younger brother’s 
signatures along with their personal details, including their cell phone and national identity card 
numbers.156  A complaint had been filed at the station by a Mohammad Khurram Shehzad, a local 
printer, who reported to have seen the brothers handing out the pamphlets. On this basis the police 
officers immediately filed an FIR.157 However the correct procedure was not followed by the Civil Lines 
police, who since the revision of the procedure under the blasphemy laws in 2004, are obliged to have 
any blasphemy complaints thoroughly investigated by a superintendent before the filing of an FIR.158 A 
sub inspector and an assistant superintendent had been assigned to this case.  When a local leader of 
the Christian community challenged this, he reported that he was told by the Station House Officer 
(SHO) that the rules had been relaxed due to pressure from conservative religious groups in the 
area.159 
 
On 3 July the police took Rashid to the Anti Terrorist Court (ATC) for police remand. The ATC  did not 
have jurisdiction over the crime; the case was therefore refused and he was taken to duty magistrate 
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Mr. Aamir Habib in the Civil Lines jurisdiction.160 Habib agreed to his two-day remand in police custody, 
despite the breach of procedure.161 During this time Sajid Emmanuel, 30, voluntarily submitted to 
police detention in the presence of a Bishop Joseph Couetts of Faisalabad (as a safeguard against the 
abuse of police power). Handwriting samples were taken, but the Lahore-based experts brought into 
the case stated that they could not assess the original evidence because they were photocopied.  
According to the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), during the court proceedings the 
investigating officer told the court that there was no evidence of blasphemy by the brothers, and that 
therefore the police had no cause to further remand them in custody. Despite the apparent danger, 
the court ordered that the two men be held in judicial custody until another court appearance in which 
further orders would be issued.162 
The brothers reported threats from co-detainees while in detention. Greater threats were issued from 
outside the prison where groups of organised orthodox Muslim activists began hold marches against 
the brothers, and later against all Christians in the area. These escalated into street violence and riots, 
which appear to have been slowly and inadequately addressed by officials in the town, as detailed 
below. Despite calls for greater protection for the brothers from local concern groups and wider 
national and regional NGOs, both were fatally shot by unknown assailants as they emerged from the 
courthouse on 19 July 2010. One officer was also shot and critically injured.163  
 
According to local media reports, the Inspector General of Police (IGP) in Punjab suspended both 
Muhammad Haneef, the Superintendent of the Police (Investigation Branch), and the Deputy 
Superintendent of the Police due to their ‘failure maintain law and order’, and Prime Minister Syed 
Yousaf Raza Gilani personally phoned the Chief Minister of Punjab for an appraisal of the 
situation.164On 22 July the  Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, Khawaja Mohammad Sharif, took the 
exceptional step of suo moto action, ordering a judicial inquiry on the request of the Punjab 
government, to be submitted to the high court, and appointing a district and sessions judge of the 
Labour Court in Faisalabad, Sheikh Muhammad Yousaf, as the inquiry judge.165 In a report to the Chief 
Justice, Regional Police Officer Faisalabad Aftab Ahmad Cheema admitted that police officers had been 
negligent despite directions to ensure adequate security for the detainees.166 This was later supported 
by documents obtained by national newspaper, The Dawn, including reports from various meetings 
between the RPO, the district intelligence Committee and the Police Commissioner to discuss the 
gravity of the case, ensure adequate security and avoid sectarian violence, promising ‘all possible 
measures’.167 The meetings also reportedly discussed the consequences of a poor investigation into 
                                                 
160  Ibid. 
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the case on the community.   
 
Additional Information:  
Therefore despite decisions taken by high ranking officers to protect the Emmanuel brothers and 
conduct a credible investigation into the blasphemy charges against them, the detainees were still not 
afforded adequate protection, nor were they speedily acquitted. This case exposes the challenges of 
adequately administrating the blasphemy laws and preventing its abuse, particularly in areas of 
frequent sectarian conflict.  
 
 Faisalabad is the third largest city in Pakistan, after Karachi and Lahore, and is well within the reach 
and influence of senior law enforcers and policy makers, yet remains a place in which politicians 
inflame ethnic tensions, and where religious minorities regularly experience high profile persecution 
yet are afforded minimal protection in the face of mainstream hostility.168 The city has one of the 
country’s largest Christian communities, with approximately 100,000 Christians living in the Warispura 
slum.169 
 
As noted by the AHRC and local NGO and media commentators, the security provisions for the two 
men were minimal: just three police officials, including the investigation officer, were assigned to 
produce the accused brothers at the court, although the Christian community had already asked the 
local administration for greater police protection.170 Prior to the men’s deaths groups of organised 
Muslim activists had started to rally against the brothers in public, with loudspeakers from a number of 
mosques used illegally to incite violence against local Christians, along with various other acts of 
aggression.171 On 7 July a procession in Warispura included the chanting of slogans against Christians – 
one of which called for the hanging of Rashid and Sajid –and the windows and doors of a Catholic 
church were attacked and broken; on 10 July the violence had escalated to the burning of tyres and a 
call for Christians to be driven from Warispura, and as many left that night with their belongings they 
were harassed by men on motorbikes. The AHRC claimed that efforts by the local government to quell 
the protest and mediate with its key leaders reportedly began in the evening of 10 July and were 
largely ineffective, with a large rally forming the following day, led by Muslim leaders from various 
religious and political parties (among them Khatme-e-Nabowat, Jamiat Ulema-ePakistan and Namoos-
e-Risalat) which reportedly reiterated death threats against the brothers.172 Commentators also noted 
that security staff at the gate of the Sessions Court Faisalabad usually confiscate small weapons such as 
knives and nail-cutters, raising questions has to how guns were allowed inside the court premises.173   
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In July 2010 The Dawn reported that a case under Section 155-C of the Police Order has been 
registered against the investigation officer and District Superintendent of Police, who was taken into 
custody, where he secured bail.174 It also reported that the Federal Minister for Minorities Affairs 
Shahbaz Bhatti told The Dawn that a communication had been sent to all provincial governments to 
protect those under trial for blasphemy, inside and outside of jail.175 The same report noted that there 
were plans to introduce amendments to the blasphemy laws to prevent its misuse, noting that those 
who level false charges should also be punished.   
 
Among those condemning the government’s handling of the case was the country's Human Rights 
Commission, which declared it ‘a sad reflection on the state's obligation to protect the lives of all 
citizens’.176 Demands by NGOs included the setting up of an inquiry commission headed by a former 
judge of the Supreme Court, a bill to be tabled aimed at repealing the blasphemy laws on the 
recommendations of Parliamentary Standing Committees on Minorities, Religious Affairs and Human 
Rights, and the founding of an autonomous Commission on Minorities under the Prime Minister, 
rather than under the Ministry of Religious Affairs or Minority Affairs.177 Rallies were also coordinated 
by the All Pakistan Minorities Alliance (APMA), the National Director of the Justice and Peace 
Commission.178 
 
C. The case of Zaibun Nisa 
According to reports from the media and human rights organisations, Zaibun Nisa, 55 (in July 2010 as 
reported by Reuters, and aged 60 as reported by the BBC), from Maari Danish Mandan village in Suhala 
area, was arrested on 16 October 1996 by Sahala police, near Islamabad after a Muslim cleric filed a 
complaint against her for desecrating a copy of the Quran under Section 295-B of the PPC.179 Contrary 
to most English-language media reports, which noted that Nisa then spent the next 14 years in the 
remand section of a mental hospital in Lahore, a recent interview with the victim in Pakistan’s Express 
Tribune reports that she remained in jail for nine years and then spent a further five years at the 
Punjab Institute of Mental Health after a judge in a Rawalpindi sessions court was informed that she 
had been diagnosed with chronic schizophrenia.180  
The complainant, Qari Mohammad Hafeez, claimed to have found torn pages of the Quran thrown in a 
drain, however before the Lahore High Court in 2010, Hafeez stressed that his complaint had been 
registered against ‘unknown offenders’. Media reports claim that a police official had admitted that 
Nisa had been arrested to ‘defuse the tension’, after which she had been forgotten about. Nisa’s sister 
Azizun Nisa informed media that the victim was a divorcee, dependent on her nephews, and that they 
had arranged for her arrest; Azizun Nisa had been told that her sister had died while police were 
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informed that she did not have relatives.181 Lawyer Aftab Ahmed Bajwa discovered Nisa and took up 
her case in 2009, and filed a petition for her release. He claims that an examination had been carried 
out by a medical board shortly after her arrest that certified her as mentally ill. He has also stated that 
no evidence was ever produced that linked her to the crime.182  
 
This case shows the extent to which the minimal safeguards already built into Pakistan’s blasphemy 
laws are neither followed nor sufficient, leaving them wide open to abuse by those with authority 
against those who have none, for various non-judicial ends. In this incident we see the law being 
arbitrarily used as a tool by those ill equipped to exercise their authority, against an ‘easy target’. As a 
divorced, mentally disabled woman, financially dependent on her male relatives, Zaibun Nisa is among 
the most vulnerable social demographic groups in Pakistan. The case illustrates that the blasphemy 
laws is particularly dangerous in countries without strong, well supported and accountable 
administrative and legal systems, and in a society in which persons feel too vulnerable to acts of 
vigilante justice to themselves approach and use the law. This is highlighted by the fact that few if any 
of those acquitted by the law ever file for damages.183  
 
D. The case of the Layahh Ahmadi  
Four teenage students and an adult from the Ahmadi minority Muslim sect were arrested on 28 
January 2009 in Kot Sultan, a village in the Layyah district, Pujab, on the charge that they had written 
the name of Prophet Muhammed on the walls of a toilet in the Gulzare Madina Mosque, in village 
172/TDA.184 The complaint, filed by Liaquat Ali, a mainstream Muslim from village 172/TDA, led to the 
arrest of Mubashar Ahmed, 50; Muhammad Irfan, 14; Tahir Imran, 19; Tahir Mehmood, 19 and Naseeb 
Ahmed, 16, by Kot Sultan police. The boys were students from grades nine and ten of the Superior 
Academy in village 172/TDA.185 
According to local and regional NGOs, among them the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) 
and the AHRC, police neglected to follow due process in the arrests, with no investigation conducted 
by a high ranking officer beforehand, and no proof presented that could link the accused to the 
graffiti.186 Charges were filed under Section 295-C of the PPC after the detainees had spent 
approximately four hours in custody. The reasoning and investigation of the FIR were found to be 
insufficient by a HRCP fact finding team in a report published in February 2009.187 The report directly 
cited the  reasoning in the FIR as follows:  
 
A few days prior to the lodging of the FIR, Mr. Muhammad Safdar – a resident of Chak 173/TDA 
– saw the name of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) written in the mosque’s toilet. He told the 
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prayer leader, Qari Muhammad Saeed, about the writing. The prayer leader said he knew 
about the writing and was probing the matter. The prayer leader scratched the name from the 
toilet’s walls. Thereafter, an employee of Government High School Chak 172/TDA, Shahbaz 
Qasim, also saw the writing in the toilet. Qasim told his father Noor Elahi Kaulachi who 
contacted Union Nazim Syed Ghazanfar Abbas. The nazim asked his secretary Mr. Ehsan to 
probe the matter. Kaulachi, who is a retired teacher, along with residents of villages 171/TDA, 
172/TDA, 173/TDA and 174/TDA contacted Syed Iqbal Shah who made a telephone call to 
police station in-charge who visited the village. When Hakeem Muhammad Hanif, Safdar Mahr 
and Shahbaz Qasim tried to probe the incident they learned that four students from the 
Ahmadiyya community -- Mohammad Irfan, Tahir Imran, Tahir Mehmood and Naseeb Ahmed – 
used to offer prayers in the mosque and used the toilets there. Mubasher Ahmed, another 
Ahmadi, was also seen offering Friday prayers in the mosque. Shahbaz Qasim stopped the 
Ahmadis from offering prayers in the mosque, due to which they [the accused] tried to create 
trouble. We [the complainant and other villagers] suspect since these Ahmadis are the only 
non-Muslims coming to the mosque, therefore they must have committed the offence. 
 
The AHRC, on questioning police officers at Kot Sultan Police Station, also reported that officers 
admitted to being under the threat of strikes, public aggression and agitation from fundamentalist 
groups in the neighbourhood, and that they did not begin their investigation for more than a month 
after the arrests.188 The HRCP noted that Station Head Officer Khalid Rauf: 
 
*…+ conceded that the law requires that an inquiry by a superintendent of police (SP) must 
be conducted about the occurrence before the registration of a case on charges of 
blasphemy. However, he added that an SP Investigation had not been appointed to the 
district for over two years, therefore, an investigation prior to the registration of the case 
could not be conducted. Now, the SP Investigation of Rajanpur district has been assigned 
to oversee the investigation of the case. SHO Khalid Rauf said he had visited the village and 
examined the place of occurrence. He said he found no eyewitnesses or any other 
evidence in the case and the FIR was based on suspicion about the accused. He said he 
saw reason in the stance of the complainant and the local residents that no Muslim can 
write the name of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) on a toilet’s walls. When asked if an 
Ahmadi could do such a thing, he refused to answer. 
 
Families of the boys also reported that raiding police had promised to detain the boys for just 24 hours 
to ease the pressure of Muslim fundamentalists in the area, and that they were given similar reasoning 
by phone by the district police officer (DPO) of Layyah Police Station, Dr Muhammad Azam, shortly 
after the charges were filed.189 The relatives told NGOs that Azam claimed that ‘the group had 
threatened to close down the whole city and attack the houses of Ahmedi sect members’ and that he 
was worried about civilian deaths.190 Shortly after their arrest the accused were transferred from Kot 
Sultan to Saddar Police Station in Layyah city, before being confined to the judicial wing of the Dera 
Ghazi Khan district prison on 4 February 2009, where, according to information directly received from 
Jamaat Ahmadiyya Pakistan, Pakistan’s main Ahmadi community organisation – they remained until 
24 April 2010.   
 
During the detention of the suspects the senior superintendent of police (SSP) of Rajanpur, Mr. Pervez 
Rathore was assigned to conduct the investigation in the neighbouring district and prepare a report 
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that would allow police to submit a challan (case diary) in court. The SSP’s report found that the case 
had no base and recommended that the accused persons be released, and the report was sent to the 
Punjab Ministry of the Interior at the end of March 2009, where it remained for a considerable length 
of time. In May of that year the AHRC wrote claiming that the process had been afflicted by 
administrative confusion, and was being stalled. 191  The AHRC  stated that ‘on the instruction of the 
first class magistrate, Layyah, the provincial police have to submit the challan on April 28. However, it 
was again deferred to May 12. The local police say that they could not submit challan as they are 
waiting for instructions from the government of Punjab.’192 At this stage the complainant and his 
supporters were still reportedly adamant that the Ahmadis be punished on the basis of presumption, 
while police officers were reportedly reluctant to release the detained boys and man for concerns over 
their safety in the community. The court found the accused not guilty and released them in July, 
according to Saleem Ud Din, the director of public affairs and spokesperson for the Jammat Ahmadiyya 
Pakistan, who informed the authors of this paper that:  
 
A bail petition before Additional Session Judge was moved on their behalf on June 13 2009 
which was rejected. Subsequently another bail application was filed with the High 
Court and the same was accepted on July 07 2009, and after completion of other legal 
formalities they were released on bail. They joined the court proceeding to face the trial at 
Layyah where fanatic opponents created [an] adverse and terrible situation for them. 
Feeling unsafe and danger to the corporus of the accused their lawyer moved an 
application before the High Court for the transfer of their case to another place. The 
learned High Court thus transferred their case to Multan where the case proceedings 
commenced on 03-09-2009 and during various dates of hearing the procedure as laid 
down in law was completed and finally all the accused who were already on bail were 
acquitted on 24-04-2010.193 
 
Aama notes that it has not been possible for the former accused to return to their neighbourhoods 
‘due to the ‘poor law and order situation’.   
 
Additional information: 
During the fact finding mission, HRCP members found that around half a dozen families of the 
Ahmadiyya community lived in 172/TDA, and had done so peacefully for many years. However earlier 
that year the principal of the village’s Superior Academy had received permission from the prayer 
leader at Gulzar-e-Madina mosque for the Ahmadi students to offer prayers there. Within a week a 
villager, Qasim Shahbaz (employed by the local government high school) had objected and obstructed 
the students, and they had not returned. Approximately ten days after this incident the blasphemy 
complaint was filed, instigated by Syed Iqbal Shah, who is a ‘local influential and a relative of a National 
Assembly member from the area’ according to the fact finding report, who ‘preferred to believe the 
version of the local residents who back his family in the elections.’ The report then emphasises that the 




In its concluding paragraphs this report later notes that a press conference held by the complainant 
and his supporters from various illegal religious organisations, ‘shows that undue influence was 
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exerted by religious and political elements to pressure the police into registering a case’ and that 
‘almost all the extremists urging action against the Ahmadis are not natives of the village’. NGOs 
reported that at least one of the students, Mukhtar Ahmed, 15, fell ill with typhoid due to the 
conditions in remand, and that the boys were denied visits by family.  
 
Various media reports claimed that the Ahmadi population in Kot Sultan was besieged following the 
incident, with individual acts of harassment, inflammatory posters, calls in the community for their 
social and economic boycott and public threats by extremists groups of arson of Ahmadi homes. Asma 
Jahangir, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and, at the time, Chair of 
the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, described the arrests as ‘heinous.’195  
 
The case is a clear example of the extent to which law enforcement and the judicial process can be 
held hostage, weakened and warped by religious and political agitators in Pakistan. Blasphemy laws 
here remain a tool for those who wish to inflame ethnic tension and persecute minorities, often for 
their own ends, and Pakistan’s own history of using the blasphemy laws against Ahmadis is well 
established. For a law that carries a death penalty this is of particularly deep concern.  As noted by 
Ahmadi News Outlet, The Ahmadiya Times: 
 
*…+ successive democratically elected governments have failed to respond to the 
nationwide persecution of minorities. Since coming to power in 2008, the current Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP) government has announced on three occasions that the blasphemy 
laws will be reformed. It was only after the Lahore attacks against Ahmadis that PPP 
politicians began drafting legislation that called for harsh punitive measures against those 
who accuse others of blasphemy without sound proof. Though welcome, such legislation is 
a disappointing reminder that more radical changes to the constitution, which are needed, 
will not be effected in the foreseeable future.196 
 
Such laws in an apparently ill regulated system can afford no effective national protection for 
vulnerable persons, and no reliable safeguards other than the repeal of the laws themselves. As noted 
in the conclusion, the laws again prove contrary to Pakistan’s obligations to protect vulnerable persons 
under various treaties and obligations under international law. 
 
 E. The case of Naushad Valyani  
Muslim doctor, Naushad Valyani, was arrested on charges of committing blasphemy on 10 December 
by police from Cantt police station in Hyderabad, Sindh province. According to the AHRC, Valyani was 
working in his surgery on 9 December when he was accused of blasphemy by Mohammad Faizan, a 
medical representative of Pfizer Pharmaceuticals. In reporting the doctor’s account of the incident the 
AHRC relates that, since the doctor was receiving patients and could not entertain the visitor at the 
time, he placed his business card in a box beside his desk, however Faizan left the office and shouted 
that the doctor had committed blasphemy, since the name of the Prophet was written on the business 
card and the doctor had thrown it in the rubbish bin. Media accounts claims that it is the 
complainant’s own name ‘Mohammad’ that he referred to, rather than there being a specific mention 
of the Prophet on the card. According to the AHRC, witnesses at the scene were reportedly satisfied 
that the box was not a rubbish bin.  
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Other local media reports have issued a variation of this incident, in which Faizan first issued his 
blasphemy accusations in an incident the following day on his return to the doctor’s surgery with 
colleagues, which resulted in a ‘violent quarrel’.197 The AHRC reports that this group comprised 
medical representatives from various local and multinational pharmaceutical companies, and that they 
held a protest demanding the arrest of the doctor on charges of blasphemy. The Commission alleges 
that the doctor was not well-liked among the representatives due to his support of natural remedies.  
 
The Cantt police complied with the protest demands, Valyani was arrested and his clinic cordoned off. 
The AHRC notes that the police then neglected to follow the correct legal procedure, or observe the 
safeguards written into the blasphemy laws, with a junior police officer (an Assistant Sub Inspector of 
Police) rather than a Senior Superintendent of Police being assigned to investigate the case.198 The 
complaint under Section 296-C of the PPC, was publically supported by local religious leaders and, if 
convicted the doctor would have faced a death sentence. 199 However  according to the Centre For 
Legal Aid Assistance and Settlement (CLAAS), 200 the investigation did not uncover evidence of 
intention to blaspheme and, thanks in part to pressure from civil society organisations, the doctor was 
released on 13 December 2010 and has returned to his practice. 
 
The case was cited in media reports as another example of the lax, ludicrous and selective handling of 
blasphemy laws in Pakistan, since the complaint was subject to an unreasonably broad interpretation 
of the law, and clear personal motive. As noted by various media and human rights commentators, a 
vast proportion of the country’s men are called Mohammad and the name is printed daily on items 
that are later discarded without religious or legal consequence. The arrest of the accused on such 
tenuous charges, without evidence or a credible investigation, violates his right to freedom from 
arbitrary arrest under international law, as enshrined in the ICCPR. It should be noted that Dr. Valyani 
is from the Ismaili Muslim community, which is a minority religious sect of Shiite origin,201 and as a 
member of a religious minority he has rights to be free from persecution and all forms of harassment 
(which would include legal harassment), under both the ICCPR and the ICERD.   
 
3.1.5. Conclusion 
Each case study above clearly demonstrates the ways in which laws that criminalise the 
defamation of religion, when considered in practice, stand in strong conflict with international human 
rights standards. As a party to the ICCPR, Pakistan is obliged to uphold the right to free expression and 
the freedom of religion as detailed in Section One, which includes the positive obligation to prevent 
rights violations, protect citizens from such violations and to punish those who carry out such 
violations. Although the state has made reservations to Articles 18 and 19, these reservations do not 
allow it to go against the purpose and spirit of the Covenant.  
 
As seen in the course of these recent cases, blasphemy laws are commonly misused as a tool of 
repression: whether against Ahmadi students who wished to worship in a local mosque or a Muslim 
doctor who wanted to run his practice in a particular, legitimate way. By allowing these laws to be 
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198  Pakistan Daily Times, ‘Blasphemy cases only after SP’s investigation’, 31 July 2004, 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_31-7-2004_pg7_17. 
199  Karachi News.Net, ‘Pakistan's archaic blasphemy laws claim doctor’, 13 December 2010, 
http://www.karachinews.net/story/719217. 
200  According to communications with Nadeem Anthony, Research Officer at CLAAS, http://claas.org.uk/blasphemy-
campaigns.aspx 
201  Fides News Agency, ‘Blasphemy in a “frenzy”: a Muslim doctor incriminated’, 15 December 2010, (Fides describes itself, in its 
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liberally applied the state is failing to uphold its positive obligations. By failing to provide adequate 
protection to victims and defendants and allowing vigilante actions to be carried out without 
investigation or prosecution, the state appears to sanction the violence. In many of these cases the 
significant malfunctioning of the law enforcement authorities led to the arbitrary detention of these 
persons, which violates Article 9 of the ICCPR.  
 
As party to the ICERD and according to Article 20 of the ICCPR, Pakistan is obliged to protect its 
subjects from racial or religious hatred. This is an obligation also enshrined in its own constitution,202 
yet cases of blasphemy are predominantly and arbitrarily taken against minority persons,203 suggesting 
a systematic form of persecution and legal harassment, waged by the lower levels of the state 
hierarchy and condoned by the higher levels. Rather than being assessed and dismissed in the initial 
stages of prosecution (as provided for by the rarely-used 2004 amendment to criminal procedure),  
many such cases are overturned at the highest levels of the judiciary.  Each of these has resulted in the 
traumatisation of the accused (including their subjection to extreme physical danger), and the wasting 
of national resources. Indeed members of the police force and the lower judiciary themselves appear 
to be susceptible to prejudices and political interference, which throws strong doubt upon the ability 
of the judicial system to fairly try such cases, many of which are met with the death penalty.204 The 
results of this study make a strong case for the repeal of the laws and their replacement with a 
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203  As covered in section 3.1.2 
204  Though as noted in section 3.1.2, a judicial execution has yet to be carried out.  
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3.2. Algeria 
 
3.2.1. Legislation  
Algeria has a population of 36 million that is 99 percent Sunni Muslim.205 There are only 
estimates of the population that belongs to other Muslims sects, Christians and Jews.206 Estimates of 
the Christian and Jewish population vary between 12,000 and 50,000.207 Islam is the state religion of 
Algeria as stated 
Article 2, ‘Islam is the religion of the state’. Even so the Constitution guarantees in its Article 36 
freedom of religion (‘Freedom of creed and opinion is inviolable’). ‘Freedom of expression and 
association and meeting is guaranteed’ by Article 41 of the Constitution. 208 Blasphemy laws in Algerian 
legislation can be found in three different sets of laws: in the Algerian Penal Code, in the Information 
Code of 1990 and in Ordinance 06-03 of 2006. 
Article 144 bis 2 of the Penal Code  
The relevant Article of the penal code is Article 144 bis 2 which bans insults against Islam, the Prophet 
Mohammed or any of the messengers of God or denigrating the dogma or precepts of Islam.209 The 
Article specifies that such insults can be committed by writing, drawing, or any other means.210 The 
punishment can be from three to five years of imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 Algerian 
dinars ($ 670-1’340).211 Most blasphemy cases are brought under this provision.212  
Ordinance 06-03 of 2006 
Ordinance 06-03 of 2006213 (hereinafter ‘the Ordinance’), enforced since February 2008,214  regulates 
religious associations other than Islam (Article 1). The Ordinance provides for the freedom of practising 
religions other than Islam, in the scope provided by the Ordinance, the Constitution and other laws 
and regulations and provides that public order, morality, and the rights and basic freedoms of others 
shall be respected (Article 2). The Ordinance legislates administrative requirements on non-Muslim 
religious associations, obliging them to register places of worship and limiting worship to registered 
sites. Article 11 of the ordinance prohibits proselytizing among Muslims on behalf of other religions 
and the distribution of materials aimed at ‘shaking the faith of a Muslim’.215 
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2001), http://www.droit.mjustice.dz/legisl_fr_de_06_au_juil_08/code_penal_avec_mod_06.pdf. 
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www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/95.pdf. 
213  Ordonnance n° 06-03 du 29 Moharram 1427 correspondant au 28 février 2006 fixant les conditions et règles d'exercice des 
cultes autres que musulman (rectificatif), http://collectifalgerie.free.fr/fr/?page_id=16. Unofficial english translation from 
Collectif Algérie - Pour la défense des Croyants autres que musulmans en Algérie available at: 
http://collectifalgerie.free.fr/english/?page_id=4.  
214  Department of State, 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom -Algeria, p.2, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148812.htm. 
215 Art . 11: ‘Sans préjudice des peines plus graves, est puni d’un emprisonnement de deux (2) ans à cinq (5) ans et d’une amende 
de 500.000 DA à 1.000.000 DA quiconque : 
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According to Algerian government officials the Ordinance is designed to apply to non-Muslims the 
same constraints that the penal code imposes on Muslims. In effect the Ordinance and the penal code 
enable the government to shut any informal religious service that takes place in private homes or in a 
secluded outdoor setting.216 
 
The Information Code of 1990  
The Information Code of 1990 governs the media. Article 26 and Article 77 of the code prohibit 
blasphemous publications. Article 26 prohibits publications that are ‘contrary to Islamic morals, 
national values, human rights’. Article 77 prohibits insults against Islam and other ‘heavenly religions’ - 
that is Christianity and Judaism.217 However, blasphemy cases based on Article 26 and or Article 77 of 
the Information Code are not known.218  
 
International treaties  
Algeria has ratified several of the core international human rights treaties. It is party to the ICCPR, the 
UN Convention Against Torture, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).219 Algeria also holds a seat on the UN 
Human Rights Committee, whose members have to commit to uphold and protect human rights.220 
 
3.2.2 Cases 
The following cases illustrate how the Algerian blasphemy legislation violates the state’s 
Constitution as well as international human rights standards.221 The main underlying reason for this is 
the vague terminology of Algeria’s blasphemy legislation, that allows police officials and judges to 
impose their own religious perspective on society, and to give their version of Islamic practice the 
force of law.222  
 
A. The case of Hocini and Fellak  
Hocine Hocini and Salem Fellak were arrested on 13 August 2010 for breaking the fast during 
the holy month of Ramadan.223 Hocini and Fellak both converted to Christianity, Hocini in 2002 and 
Fellak in 2009.224 The accused were taking a break and eating on the construction site in Ain El- 
Hammam, where they both work, when the police arrested them.225 At the Police station in Ain El- 
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223  ABC news, ‘Christians tried for breaking Ramadan fast’, 22.09.2010, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/09/22/3018315.htm. 
224  Amnesty International, Public Statement, ’ Algeria: Drop charges against men accused of breaking Ramadan fast’, 1.10.2010, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE28/011/2010/en 
225  Spiegel Online, ‘Christlichen Fastenbrechern droht mehrjährige Haftstrafe’, 21.09.2010,  
- 43 - 
Hammam they were interrogated about breaking the Ramadan fast.226 When brought before the 
deputy prosecutor Hocini and Fellak explained that they were Christians and therefore do not observe 
Ramadan. Hocini and Fellak reported to Amnesty International that the deputy prosecutor stated that 
Algeria is a Muslim country, and that Christians should go to Europe, and therefore questioned how 
the men could be both Algerian and Christian at the same time.227 On 26 September 2010 the 
prosecution demanded a sentence for both men of three years in prison because of ‘threatening the 
precepts of Islam’228 on the bases of Article 144 bis 2 penal code.229 At the trial on 5 October 2010 both 
men were acquitted.230  
 
This very recent case exemplifies how the vague wording of Article 144 bis 2 penal code can lead to the 
arbitrary imposition of individual interpretation of the law on the part of police officials and 
prosecution officials. Interpreting the breaking of the Ramadan fast, notably by two Christians, as 
‘threatening the precepts of Islam’ is not within an acceptable scope of Article 144 bis 2 penal code, as 
affirmed by the acquittal of both men. Even if the two men were Muslim, there is no specific provision 
in the Algerian legislation that that criminalises not fasting.231 This practice violates Algeria’s 
constitution that grants freedom of religion in its Article 36 as well as their international human rights 
obligations under Article 18 ICCPR. The reported remark by the deputy prosecutor constitutes an 
additional violation of the freedom of religion.  
 
B. The case of Djamila Salhi and her cousin 
On 9 September 2009 the Algerian newspaper EL-Watan reported the following story.232 
Djamila Salhi and her male cousin were eating a sandwich in their car during the Ramadan while 
parking in Ben Aknoun on 1 September 2009 when two policemen in civilian dress approached them. 
The policemen questioned them about their religion, they are both Muslim, and subsequently asked 
Salhi and her cousin to accompany them to the police station in Draria in order to verify their 
identity.233 At the police station the policemen reportedly first tried to make them admit to drinking 
alcohol in the car. Subsequently the policemen changed their mind and accused them of eating in 
public in the presence of pedestrians. The police commanded Salhi to sign a statement in this regard in 
Arabic, a language she does not know how to speak and write. Salhi and her cousin had to undergo a 
medical exam and spend the night at the police station. In the morning of 3 September 2009 the 
cousins were brought in handcuffs to the district attorney. The district attorney charged them on the 
bases of Article 144 bis 2 because of ‘denigrating the dogma or precepts of Islam’234 and ordered their 
transfer to the El Harrach prison. At El Harrach prison Salhi had to spend the night on the floor because 
there was no free bed in the women’s section. In the night of 3 September Salhi and her cousin were 
unexpectedly released after the intervention of a ‘senior official’; all charges were dropped and the 
case was effectively erased from police files.235 While Salhi and her cousin were formally arrested and 
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charged before being moved to the prison, their release did not take place in a formal procedure.236 
 
As outline in the case of Hocini and Fellake, the Algerian law does not hold a provision that criminalizes 
not fasting during the holy month of Ramadan. Eating during daytime in Ramadan is also not a criminal 
offence under Article 144 bis 2 penal code. Thus no legal bases existed for the arrest and subsequent 
charges of Salhi and her cousin. Hence their right to legality granted by Article 46 of the Constitution 
and by Article 15 ICCPR, has been violated. This case further illustrated how accusations of blasphemy 
can lead to the violation of the right to due process. Article 14 (3a) grants the right to the defendant to 
be informed in a language that he understands of the nature and the cause of the charges against him. 
Salhi was pressured into signing a statement, of which the content did not give the correct account of 
the incident and was in Arabic, a language that Salhi does not master. This is a clear violation of the 
right to due process by Article 14 ICCPR. 
  
C. The case of Bouderbala and Bousaâd  
Berkane Bouderbala, the editor of the weekly Essafir and its religious supplement Errisala was 
arrested on 11 February 2006 and Kamal Bousaâd, the director of the weekly Panorama, was arrested 
on 8 February 2006 after reprinting the controversial Danish Cartoons depicting the prophet 
Muhammad.237 The arrest was based on Article 144 bis 2 penal code and came about subsequent to 
the complaint of the Ministry of Communications.238 They were held at the Serkadji prison in Algiers 
until their release on March 15 2006, when the charges against both man were dropped.239 Both 
publications were temporarily shut down. Similar cases took place in Malaysia240 and Yemen 
subsequent to the reprinting of the cartoons.241 
 
Freedom of expression is a core human right and has been violated gravely in this case. It is necessary 
to protect the exercise of all other human rights, because it is essential for holding governments 
accountable to the public.242 The reprinting of the Danish Cartoons does not fall within the scope of 
limitation of Article 19 (3) ICCPR and neither is it incitement to hatred and therefore not prohibited by 
Article 20 ICCPR.243 
 
D. The cases of Rachid Seghir  
Christian convert Rachid Seghir has been charged and tried three times for religious offences 
under Article 144 bis Penal Code and ordinance 06-03. Together with another convert, Youssef 
Ourahmane, Seghir was charged in February 2008 under Ordinance 06-03 for ‘blaspheming the name 
of the Prophet and Islam.’244 In November 2007 Seghir and Djammal Dahmani were charged with 
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proselytizing and illegally practising a non-Muslim faith and sentenced in absentia to two years in 
prison and fines of 500,000 dinars ($6,800) by court in Tissemsilt. In July 2008 in the retrial when both 
men appeared in front of court the sentences were reduced to a prison sentence of six months 
suspended and fines of 100,000 dinars ($1,360) on the bases of the same charges.245  
Seghir was also convicted in a separate trial in Tiaret in June 2008. He was charged with proselytizing 
and illegally practicing a non-Muslim faith and sentenced to six months suspended prison sentence 
and a fine of 200,000 dinars ($ 2,720). 246  
 
3.2.3 Conclusion  
The outlined cases illustrate how the Algerian blasphemy legislation violates international 
human rights law as well as Algeria’s own constitution. The vague terminology of Article 144 bis of the 
Penal Code leads to selective, arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Even though most outlined 
cases finally lead to an acquittal, such unsuccessful legal action can encourage a society to self-
censorship. The blasphemy article of the penal code in itself is discriminatory, both in effect and 
content. It only protects Islam and Islamic religious figures from insult. The Algerian legislation does 
not provide the same protection for other religions.  
 
Compared to other countries such as for example Pakistan, Algeria’s blasphemy laws are not as strictly 
applied, punishments are not as harsh and there are relatively few cases. Nevertheless Algeria is a 
helpful example for the international community to understand the impact of blasphemy law on 
human rights, the rule of law and society as a whole. This should stand for an example of risks of an 


























                                                 
245  Ibid. 
246  Ibid. 
- 46 - 
3.3. The Syrian Arab Republic 
 
The Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) is a multi ethnic and religious state that does not pursue a 
certain state religion.247 For the past five decades power has been confined to the minority Alawite 
sect.248 After the Ba'ath party seized power in 1963, the country was ruled by Alawite President Hafez 
al-Assad from 1970 until his death in 2000 when power was transferred to his son Bashar al-Assad. 
Renowned for its religious liberal and secular character in comparison to other OIC member states, 
Syria's record of inhumane practises applied against opposition groups is subject to strong criticism 
voiced by international and local human rights organisations as well as UN reports. Despite the fact 
that no particular state religion is declared in Syria and neither does the legislation promote any 
blasphemy laws, the imposition of harsh restrictions on the general right to freedom of expression and 
opinion has also had severe impacts on certain religious groups.249  
 
Discriminatory norms exercised by the state are directed against any group or individual that criticises 
the credibility of the government. Those alleged perpetrators are usually charged for threatening 
public order and/or incitement to sectarian unrest, mainly expressed in form of advocating certain 
religious and ethnic minority rights. In the past alleged members of so called opposition groups have 
become subject to long-term arrests, unfair trials and in many cases torture. Groups specifically 
monitored and targeted by the state include human rights defenders, the Kurdish population as well as 
members of banned political and certain religious groups. Those belonging to Islamic groups such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist movement are particularly targeted. Jehovah's Witnesses is 
the only religion outlawed in Syria as they are believed to promote Zionist ideologies.250 Those 
perceived as enemies of the state are prosecuted by a special court – the Supreme State Security Court 
(SSSC, ‘Mahkama Amn al-Dawla al-`Uliyya’) that is exempted from rules of procedure followed by 
regular courts. Reports by human rights organisations estimate that hundreds of cases are tried each 
year by the SSSC, with a majority of those prosecuted allegedly belong to radical Islamist 
movements.251 
 
The following section on Syria will discuss how laws and restrictions on freedom of expression and 
belief are abused by the Syrian state in order to silence opposition groups. For the purpose of this 
research paper, an exclusive focus will be taken on groups targeted due to their religious ideologies 
and links to prohibited religious groups. It should however be noted that hundreds of Kurds, human 
rights defenders and political opposition groups are also under constant threat of their lives and 
freedoms.  
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3.3.1. Legislation 
The two main legal documents guaranteeing religious freedoms and setting its limits are found 
in the state's Constitution of 13 March 1973 and Penal Code. The ongoing state of emergency 
proclaimed in 1962, together with the implementation of special Law no. 49 in 1980 (see section 
3.3.2.), have significantly impacted the rights and freedoms enshrined in the legislation by granting 
security forces almost full impunity from judicial authority to persecute minority groups, including 
certain religious groups.  
 
The Constitution 
Article 3 (Islam) lays out the religious character of the state by proclaiming that ‘the religion of the 
President of the Republic has to be Islam’ and ‘Islamic jurisprudence is the main source of 
legislation.’252 
 
Article 28 (Defence) enshrines the principle of innocence, guaranteeing that ‘every defendant is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty by a final judicial decision and no one may be kept under 
surveillance or detained except in accordance with the law.’ It further sets out that ‘no one may be 
tortured physically or mentally or be treated in a humiliating manner. The law defines the punishment 
of whoever commits such an act.’ Lastly it also ensures the right to fair trial by stipulating ‘the right of 
litigation, contest, and defence before the judiciary is safeguarded by the law.’ 253 
 
Article 35 (Religion) proclaims freedom of all religions and belief, stipulating that ‘the freedom of faith 
is guaranteed. Respect for all religions is provided’. It further holds that the state guarantees ‘the 
freedom to hold any religious rites, provided they do not disturb the public order.’ 254 
 
Article 38 (Expression) guarantees the right of every citizen to ‘freely and openly express his views in 
words, in writing, and through all other means of expression. He also has the right to participate in 
supervision and constructive criticism in a manner that safeguards the soundness of the domestic and 
nationalist structure and strengthens the socialist system. The state guarantees the freedom of the 
press, of printing, and publication in accordance with the law’.255 
 
Article 39 (Assembly) enshrines that ‘Citizens have the right to meet and demonstrate peacefully 
within the principles of the Constitution. The law regulates the exercise of this right.’256 
 
The Penal Code 
Article 278 prescribes temporary detention for:  
1. ‘Anyone who contravenes measures taken by the State to preserve its neutrality in time 
of war. 
2. Anyone who, by engaging in acts or making written or spoken statements not authorized 
by the Government, exposes Syria to the risk of acts of aggression, disrupts its relations 
with foreign States or exposes Syrians to reprisals against their person or their 
property’.257 
 
Article 285 ‘Anyone in Syria who, during times of war or in anticipation of war, makes allegations that 
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weaken national sentiment or incite racial or sectarian strife will be punished with imprisonment’.258 
 
Article 307 ‘Stipulates that any deeds committed, writings composed, or speeches held with the 
intention of inciting sectarian or racial strife or provoking conflict between the religions and the 
various members of the nation will be condemned to prison for between six months and two years, 
fined between 100 and 200 liras’.259 
 
Article 308 ‘Prescribes the same punishment for any person belonging to an association established for 
the purpose referred to in Article 38 will receive the same penalty’.260 
 
Article 462 ‘Stipulates that any act that is likely to prevent a Syrian from exercising his civil rights or 
fulfilling his civil obligations shall be punishable by detention for a term of one month to one year’.261 
 
International Treaties 
As a founding member of the UN, Syria is party to a number of international treaties. On 21 April 1969 
Syria ratified both the ICCPR and ICERD, but has not signed any of the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR. 
Syria is party to the CEDAW and has also signed in 2004 the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but has not signed the Optional Protocol.262 
 
3.3.2. Implementation 
Despite the fact that Article 3 of the Constitution lays out the Islamic character of the law, Article 35 
guarantees the right of all religions to practice their faith freely under the condition of not disturbing 
public order. As discussed below however, under the pretext of safeguarding public order, a range of 
basic civil rights such as freedom of expression and assembly are severely- and often violently 
repressed by Syrian authorities targeting any state dissidents, including certain religious minority 
groups.  
 
i. Emergency Law 
On 22 December 1962 Syria imposed emergency law, which was amended by Decree-Law No.1 of 9 
March 1963 and supplemented by martial laws stipulated in Military Legislation No. 2.263 The state of 
emergency is in place until today, which legitimises severe constrains on civil and political rights, and 
also guarantees according to Legislative Decree No. 61 (1950) and additional Decree No. 69  of 
September 2008 impunity against prosecution of any human rights violation committed by state 
officials.264 The draconian law of emergency provides the government's security apparatus full 
authority to issue arrest orders against anyone considered a threat to the state without having to 
provide any reasonable evidence of the alleged crime.265 While Syria continues to defend its need to 
uphold a state of emergency due the persistent threat posed by Israel's occupation of part of Syria's 
territory and the ubiquitous threat of its expansion, the international community has repeatedly called 
on Syria to immediately relinquish its state of emergency.266 According to Article 4 of the ICCPR to 
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which Syria is a signatory, the implementation of emergency law is only to be maintained on a 
temporary basis and only under the condition of a ‘public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed’.267 The almost fifty year long state of 
emergency however clearly violates its obligations under the ICCPR. The human rights organisation 
Alkarama pointed out that although Syria has a legitimate right to defend its territory, the 
implemented emergency legislation is mainly directed against domestic opposition groups and 
individuals.268  
 
ii. Law No. 49 
Special Law No. 49 passed by the Syrian People’s Council in the Session on 07 July 1980 proclaims the 
illegality of the Muslim Brotherhood. Members belonging to the group are subject to punishment 
articulated in Article 1: ‘Each and everyone belonging to the Moslem Brethren Group (Jama’a) 
organization is considered a criminal who will receive a death punishment’. 269 The group, a Sunni 
fundamentalist, anti-government and anti-Alawi movement was initially prohibited as a result of a 
failed assassination attempt on the President on June 1980. Regardless of the fact that since 1982, 
after the Muslim Brotherhood was crushed by the Syrian government, the group officially renounced 
violence and direct confrontation, Law No. 49 remains in place until today.270  The broad nature of the 
term ‘belonging’ is however not clearly defined and can therefore be applied to anyone who is thought 
to be somehow associated with the movement. This stands in clear violation of Article 28 of the Syrian 
Constitution based on the presumption of innocence. As discussed below, numerous individuals, 
including children, have been arrested merely due to family links to current and former members of 
the movement. The human rights organisation Alkarama reports that thousands of associates and 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood have been arrested since 1979 and almost 17 000 have 
disappeared since enactment of the law.271 Despite significant pressure exerted by the international 
NGO community urging Syria to abandon the death penalty, Syria has not amended its laws but in 
recent years commuted the death sentence to twelve years imprisonment with hard labour.272 
 
iii. Arbitrary arrests and unfair trials 
Numerous individuals accused of being radical Islamists or associated with fundamentalist religious 
movements have been charged by the SSSC under articles 307, 285 and 462 of the Syrian Penal code 
for allegedly causing incitement to sectarian and religious strife harming the public order.273 As further 
elaborated below, in many of these cases defendants were sent to prison despite the fact that no clear 
evidence was presented to the court proving the alleged crime or intent to commit a crime. Various 
human rights groups such as HRW as well as the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) have 
emphasised the fact that even if defendants admit to belonging to fundamentalist religious groups, 
their integrity is nevertheless protected under international law stipulating the right to freedom of 
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expression as long as their actions and appeals remain non-violent. The EctHR has stated that 
‘expressions of hostility towards national authorities, support for separatist aspirations, and promotion 
of shari`a law are protected speech to the extent they do not directly advocate violence’.274 
 
Moreover, those tried before the SSSC are usually subject to unfair trial, as highlighted in a written 
statement by CIHRS to the UNHRC in 2010. The organisation complained that most defendants are 
deprived of basic rights guaranteed by international conventions, such as the right to a defence, the 
right to an attorney, the right to hear witnesses and the right to appeal.275 Under Article 10 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR, Syria must provide 
every alleged perpetrator the right to fair trial.276 However, according to Amnesty International (AI)  
detainees and defendants are prevented from meeting their lawyer during pre-trial detention and 
consultation is often permitted for only a few minutes right before the first trial session, which clearly 
stands in violation of Article 14 (3b) of the ICCPR. Moreover, Article 14 stipulates that ‘everyone shall 
be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law’.277 Trials by the SSSC are however usually closed even for family members and defendants are 
not allowed to appeal their conviction and sentence.278  
 
3.3.2. Cases 
i) The Muslim Brotherhood 
Despite the fact that the death sentence for those convicted under Law No. 49 has frequently been 
reduced to 12 years' imprisonment in recent years, the loosely-defined criteria of “belonging” has 
resulted in the arrests of dozens of alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood on an annual basis. 
This is a clear breach of the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 28 of the Syrian 
Constitution and Article 9(1) of the ICCPR proclaiming that ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by 
law’.279 In numerous cases prosecutions of defendants were solely based on evidence such as the 
possession of CDs and books of apparently radical Imams, while no proof for a committed or intended 
crime was presented.280 Over the past years children and other family members of persons accused of 
being members of the Muslim Brotherhood have also become subject to prosecution due to the 
loosely defined nature of “belonging”.281  
 
A. Amer Hamami 
Human Rights Watch reported the case of Amer Hamami who was sentenced by the SSSC on 09 
December 2007 to three years in jail for “weakening national sentiment and awakening sectarian 
strife” (Art. 285 of Penal Code). Trial notes by European diplomats show that the only evidence 
presented against Hamami was that he had copied 25 CDs that promoted the acts of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.282   
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B. Muhammad Osama Sayes 
Born in July 1975 in Aleppo, Syria, Muhammad Osama Sayes was forced together with his family into 
exile in 1980 in fear of Law No. 49 due to his family's affiliation with the banned Muslim Brotherhood. 
In November 2000 Sayes applied for political asylum in the UK which was however refused by the 
British authorities. On 28 April 2005 Sayes was arrested and deported back to Syria on 03 May 2005. 
Upon his arrival Sayes was detained by Syrian officials and transferred to the Political Security Branch 
and then held in Seydnaya Prison where he was subject to torture and other ill-treatment. According 
to a report published by AI, the defendant was held in incommunicado detention, deprived of his right 
to consult a lawyer until January 2006. On 25 June 2006 Muhammad Osama Sayes was tried before the 
SSSC and sentenced to death. His sentence was then reduced to 12 year imprisonment.283 
 
C. Omar al-Hayyan Razzouk  
Omar al-Hayyan Razzouk was born in Baghdad, Iraq in 1986 to a Syrian father who was forced to flee 
Syria in 1983 in fear of his life due to his affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. After the American 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 the defendant was sent to Syria by his family in order to pursue a safer and 
more stable life. Prior to his arrival in Syria, Razzouk contacted the Syrian embassy in Baghdad 
explaining his family history and personal situation. The Syrian officials approved his plans and 
provided him with all necessary documents. On November 15, 2005 Razzouk was arrested by Syrian 
border police while trying to enter the country. He was arrested under Law No. 49 and was sent to 
Sednaya Prison. Razzouk was tried before the SSSC by Judge Fayez al-Nouri on charges of belonging to 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Razzouk was brought before the judge ten times persistently denying any 
affiliation with the outlawed movement or any other political group. Razzouk was convicted under Law 
No. 49 on 13 December 2009 and his death sentenced was commuted to 12 years imprisonment.284 
 
ii) Salafist/Islamist groups 
Other Islamic groups targeted by the Syrian state are frequently labelled as “Salafists”. The state 
however fails to clearly define who constitutes a member of such movement and hundreds of religious 
Islamic opposition figures have been detained over the past years. HRW reports that in the period 
between January 2007 and June 2008, the SSSC sentenced over 100 individuals on charges of 
belonging to a radical Salafist movement.285 Many alleged Islamists are prosecuted under Article 206 of 
the Penal Code, charged with attempting to change the fundamental fabric of society through terrorist 
means. However, according to HRW in most cases those prosecuted either under charges of terrorist 
acts or for inciting racial and sectarian strife (under Article 285 or 307), no clear evidence was provided 
to the SSSC proving the defendants' intention of advocating Islamic extremists' goals through violent 
means.286 Those found guilty are not only subject to unfair trials but many defendants are detained 
without an official charge or trial for extended periods of time under inhumane conditions and are 
often exposed to ill-treatment. Syria is therefore not only in violation of Article 9(3) and 14 (3c) of the 
ICCPR (stipulating the right to be tried promptly), but also of Article 9(2) as it frequently fails to declare 
the charge for which defendants are held for prolonged periods of time.287 Furthermore, Syria is 
                                                 
283  SHRC, 12 May 2005, http://www.shrc.org/data/aspx/D4/2194.aspx; SHRC, 27 June 2006, 
http://www.shrc.org/data/aspx/D5/2695.aspx; Amnesty International, MDE 24/046/2006 (Public), 26 June 2006, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE24/046/2006/en/1b61a4cf-fa04-11dd-b1b0-
c961f7df9c35/mde240462006en.pdf. 
284  SHRC, Omar Hayyan al-Razzouk sentenced pursuant to Law 49/1980, 16 December 2009, 
http://www.shrc.org/data/aspx/d19/4049.aspx. 
285  Human Rights Watch, ‘Far from Justice – Syria's Supreme State Security Court, February 2009, p.4  
286  SHRC, Omar Hayyan al-Razzouk sentenced pursuant to Law 49/1980, 16 December 2009, 
http://www.shrc.org/data/aspx/d19/4049.aspx. 
287  ICCPR Article 9 and 14, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm. 
- 52 - 
heavily criticised by the international community for allegedly inflicting torture, which is illegal under 
international law (including Article 7 of the ICCPR) but is also forbidden by Article 28(3) of its own 
Constitution.288 Amnesty International reported that no case is known where Syria's laws against 
torture have actually been implemented.289  
 
D. Mu'awiya al-Hasan 
On 23 September 2007, Mu`awiya al-Hasan, a student at the University of Damascus, was brought 
before judges of the SSSC. He was charged with “awakening sectarian strife” prohibited under Article 
285. According to trial notes by European diplomats, the Syrian authorities had found CDs of 
‘fundamentalist imams’ (Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Baz) in his apartment. The trial observers did not note 
any additional evidence presented in court. Two months later, on November 25, 2007, the SSSC 
sentenced him to two years in jail. By the time al-Hasan received his verdict, he had already been 
detained for one year and three month.290 
 
 
E. Usra al-Hassani 
On 31 July 2008 Syrian State Security officials arrested 35 year old Usra al-Hassani from her home in 
the village of al-Otayba, 20 km east of Damascus. AI believes her arrest to be related to her efforts to 
contact an international organisation in regards to the conditions of her husband held in US custody. 
Since August 2002 her husband Jehad Diab has been detained without charge or trial as an ‘enemy 
combatant’ in the US administered detention centre at Guantanamo Bay291. Usra al-Hassani was held 
incommunicado for one year without being informed of the charges against her. On 18 July 2009 Usra 
al-Hassani was released and then re-arrested on January 2010. The reason for her arrest is believed to 
relate to her involvement in a poem that is thought to incite violence against an informant to the 
security forces.292 No further reports are known about her most recent arrest. AI and HRW have called 
for the immediate release of Usra al-Hassani unless the security service has clear evidence of the 
committed crime. In a statement related to her first arrest Joe Stork, Middle East deputy of HRW 
pointed out that ‘being married to an Islamist or to a criminal suspect is not a crime’.293 
 
iii) Jehovah's Witnesses 
In 1964 the Syrian government outlawed the Jehovah's Witnesses due to their alleged Zionist motives. 
According to an US State Department report on freedom of religion in Syria, published on 2010, only a 
small number of members of the religion exist in Syria and they are forced to remain clandestine. 
While proselytizing is not illegal under Syrian law, it is however strongly discouraged by the 
government and those actively practising it might run the risk of being charged with posing a threat to 
the relations among religious groups.294 Despite the fact that fewer incidents of arrests occur under 
the charge of belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, the procedures are nevertheless the same.  
 
F. Nader Nseir 
Amnesty International reported the case of Nader Nseir, a 38 year old Syrian and follower of Jehovah's 
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Witnesses. Nseir was called in to the Political Security branch in Latakia, western Syria, and allegedly 
put under pressure to become an informant about the community. As a result of his refusal, his ID card 
was confiscated and he was prevented from returning to Lebanon, his current place of residence. In an 
attempt to illegally cross the border he was returned by Lebanese border police to Syria and taken into 
custody on 7 May 2010. Since then Nseir has been held in incommunicado detention and his location is 
unknown to his family or human rights defenders. In the global campaign to locate Nader Nseir, AI has 
warned about torture and other ill-treatments practised in Syrian prisons.295 
 
3.3.3. Conclusion 
Despite the fact that Syria does not stipulate blasphemy laws and portrays itself as a secular 
State, it illustrates how restrictions of freedom of expression are dangerously imposed under the guise 
of protecting religious and racial minority groups. As party to the ICCPR and ICERD Syria is obliged to 
fully grant freedom of speech to all, even if those opinions are not conform with the State's interests.  
Syria's ongoing state of emergency and imposition of Law No. 49 provides the basis for an 
almost unrestricted repression of certain opposition groups, including religious groups that are 
believed to endanger “public order” and essentially challenge the ruling group's power. Thousands of 
people, including prisoners of conscience are subject to arbitrary and prolonged imprisonment and are 
held incommunicado. Many others have disappeared and cases of torture and ill-treatment are 
reported frequently. Criticism voiced by the international community, calling on Syria to immediately 
terminate the repression of non-violent opposition groups under the auspice of emergency laws are 
rejected by Syria. Arguing within the framework of Article 20 of the ICCPR, Syria insists to simply  
exercise its right to set limits to the right to freedom of expression in order to prevent incitement to 
hatred. By applying Article 307 and 308 of the Syrian Penal Code, Syria claims to be consistent with its 
international obligations by merely punishing acts that endanger discrimination on religious or racial 
grounds.296 In response to such justification HRW has argued that despite Syria's legitimate right to 
protect its national integrity, Syria's definition of a security threat has been cast so broadly and vague 
that it authorises the illegal persecution of any defendant who openly or privately expresses opinions 
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Section 4: Conclusion 
 
This paper illustrates that while all parties to the debate on the defamations of religions at the 
UN, from the OIC to UN Special Rapporteurs and member states, acknowledge the pressing need to 
effectively counter incitement to hatred on racial and religious grounds, and give due recognition and 
concern to the rise of Islamophobia, a clear discrepancy exists among states concerning the method 
and instruments that should be used to counter the problem without violating fundamental human 
rights. The UN-adopted resolutions on combating defamation of religions prior to January 2011 may 
appear at first to promote tolerance by advocating limits to racism and xenophobia, but all entail 
serious flaws. Foremost among these is the shift of the protective focus away from individuals in the 
OIC-supported approach, and towards a system of belief, which makes a decisive breach with 
prevailing human rights standards. This paper concludes that by calling for the protection of Islam in 
order to safeguard Muslim communities in the West, the OIC’s proposals in practice would endanger 
religious minorities, nurture religious intolerance and ignorance, and violate the rights to freedom of 
expression and of belief enshrined in human rights law, as well as leave civilians vulnerable to the 
breach of a spectrum of other rights. The broad definition of defamation of religion in OIC resolutions 
arbitrarily restricts the leeway for individuals to exercise their rights to free speech without being 
considered too critical – directly or indirectly – of the religion, and allows laws to be selectively 
applied. 
The consequences of this have been demonstrated in the selection of recent cases taken from 
three OIC member states. Blasphemy laws in Pakistan and Algeria, and provisions of Syria’s special and 
emergency laws have been partially justified by the respective governments as a bid to protect 
minority rights. Yet by looking at their use (or misuse) in these three countries we have seen them 
wielded as instrument of persecution, involving grave violations of the rights to free expression and 
belief.  
The three countries represent a range in terms of their geographic locations and the extent of 
their legislative constraints on the issue. Although by no means exhaustive in scope, and certainly 
selected by the authors to demonstrate the derogative and arbitrary nature of these laws, all the cases 
illustrate a serious gap of protection concerning the rights of the individual.  In each case laws relating 
to religious criticism have been used to restrain, punish and persecute – often for political ends – 
persons who belong to minorities or have exercised their freedom of expression. In Syria this has been 
seen in the prolonged implementation of emergency laws that legitimise severe punishments against 
anyone perceived as a threat to the rule of a minority group. In Pakistan, as in Algeria, the courting of 
powerful, often dangerous populist religious groups by local governments has led to a protection gap 
for civilians and the weakening of the law enforcement and judicial processes. Many of the cases 
involved ill-treatment or torture and unfair trials, with procedural safeguards unavailable or 
overlooked and an enforcement system ill-equipped to protect the accused from the public fervour 
that the laws have essentially encouraged. 
  As parties to the ICCPR, states are obliged to protect the right to freedom of expression, 
though they maintain the right under Article 20(2) to also subject this to certain limitations to protect 
citizens from incitements to racial or religious hatred. However in all three countries this clause has 
been severely abused in order to protect a particular religious perspective along with the interests of 
the state; this has (often fatally) endangered the fundamental rights of individuals to free speech and 
as noted by dissenting states and UN Special Rapporteurs, caused severe damage to inter-religious 
dialogue and understanding.  
Despite Pakistan and Syria being two of the most outspoken advocates of the resolution on 
‘combating defamation of religions’ at the UN to further the protection of minorities (ostensibly 
outside of the Muslim world), this paper has shown the great dangers inherent in the OIC proposals, as 
evidenced by both states’ de facto application of oppressive blasphemy laws.  
In view of the many rights threatened by the proposal to combat ‘defamation of religions’ in a 
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binding instrument, we concur with the recommendations made by various states, NGOs and UN 
experts covered in Section Two. In de jure terms Articles 18-20 sufficiently articulate the boundaries 
and rights of the freedom of expression and belief that are necessary to protect persons from 
incitement to racial and religious hatred; it falls to states to implement them effectively. However 
equally important is the need for more open, pluralistic dialogue among religious, cultural and ethnic 
communities, which will overcome cultural and religious differences more effectively than the 
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Annex 
 
Excerpt of Pakistan’s Criminal Law Amendment ACT 2004 (ACT I, 2005) 
 
Section 156-A of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C): 
  
Investigation of offence under section - 295-C Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) – ‘Notwithstanding anything 
contained in this code, no police officer below the rank of a superintendent of police shall investigate 
the offence against any person alleged to have been committed by him under section 295-C of the 
Pakistan Penal Code, (Act XLV of 1860).’ 
 




The Lahore High Court cited the amendment in a blasphemy case in 2002:  
  





‘---Ss. 295-A, 295-B & 295-C---Blasphemy---Increase in the number of registration of blasphemy cases 
and element of mischief involved therein calls for extra care at the end of the Prosecuting Officers---
Failure, inefficiency and incompetence of the investigation in handling the case of blasphemy---
Directions by the High Court, in circumstances, directed the Inspector General of Police of the Province 
to ensure that whenever such a case is registered, the same may be entrusted for purpose of 
investigation to a team of at least two Gazetted Investigating Officers preferably those conversant with 
the Islamic Jurisprudence and in case they themselves are not conversant with Islamic law, a scholar of 
known reputation and integrity may be added to the team and the team should then investigate as to 
whether an offence is committed or not and if the team comes to the conclusion that the offence is 
committed, the police may only then proceed further in the matter---Trial in such case be held by a 
Court presided over by a Judicial Officer who himself is not less than the rank of District and Sessions 
Judge.’     
 
Published in the Pakistan Law Digest (PLD 2002, Lahore page # 588, paragraph ( c ) Penal Code (XLV of 
1860) 
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